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cross-appeal. 
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Case No. 2030 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS THE DENVER AND 
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY AND UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a new trial should be ordered for the 
reason that there is insufficient evidence to justify the 
jury's verdict to the extent it found no negligence on the part 
of the plaintiff. 
2. Whether a new trial should be ordered because the 
Rio Grande was denied its due process right to an impartial and 
unbiased jury. 
3. Whether the lower court erred in denying the Rio 
Grande's motion for partial summary judgment that it owed no 
duty to plaintiff to: (1) change the physical configurations 
present at the 1600 South Crossing from those which the UDOT 
evaluated at the time it mandated the crossing protection which 
existed at the time of the accident, or (2) slow the speed of 
its trains to below that which UDOT recognized when it mandated 
the existing crossing protection, or (3) perform any duties 
exclusively preempted by UDOT and UPSC. 
4. Whether a new trial should be ordered because of 
plaintiff's counsel's surprise and improper use in closing 
argument of testimony from a witness excused from the stand by 
order of the trial court without further direct examination and 
without any cross-examination. 
5. Whether a new trial should be ordered because the 
lower court denied the Rio Grande's requested jury instruction 
which would have instructed the jury that it could consider 
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whether plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not wearing 
his seatbelt. 
6. Whether it was error for the lower court to grant 
defendant Utah Department of Transportation's pre-trial motion 
to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a personal injury action arising from injuries 
sustained by plaintiff when he drove his automobile into the 
path of an oncoming train owned and operated by the Rio 
Grande. The accident occurred at a railroad crossing in 
Springville, Utah, which was protected by advance warning 
signs, railroad crossing signs and, in addition, a stop sign 
which required motorists to stop before proceeding across the 
railroad tracks. The plaintiff's vehicle was eastbound a: the 
time of the accident and was struck by a southbound train. The 
Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") was joined as a 
defendant because it allegedly breached certain statutory 
duties to install adequate traffic warning devices at the 
crossing. 
The Rio Grande has appealed from a judgment based upon 
a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and it has appealed an 
order of the lower court dismissing co-defendant UDOT prior to 
trial. In what is now designated a cross-appeal, the plaintiff 
has appealed the lower court's order granting the Rio Grande's 
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motion for a directed verdict as to plaintiff's claim for 
punitive damages. (R. 806; also Addendum Exhibit E"). 
B. Disposition of the Case Below 
This action was tried before a jury in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen presiding. Prior to trial, the lower 
court denied the Rio Grande's, the City of Springville's, and 
the plaintiff's respective motions for summary judgment. (R. 
407 and 569; also Addendum Exhibit "D"). A pre-trial motion to 
dismiss filed by UDOT was granted on the grounds that UDOT was, 
in the lower court's opinion, immune from suit under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. (R. 569; also Addendum Exhibit 
"D"). 
A five day jury trial was held in June, 1984. After 
the close of all the evidence, the lower court denied the Rio 
Grande's motion for a directed verdict, but granted defendant 
City of Springville's motion for a directed verdict. (R. 
1085). The case was submitted to the jury upon comparative 
negligence instructions, the court having denied the Rio 
Grande's motions for summary judgment (R. 460-61; 569-70) and 
for a directed verdict (R. 1349; 1355) requesting that the 
plaintiff be found negligent as a matter of law. The jury 
returned its verdict, finding the Rio Grande 100% at fault and 
the plaintiff 0% at fault. (R. 765-68; also Addendum Exhibit 
"A"). The lower Court entered judgment against the Rio Grande 
on August 15, 1984, in the amount of $439,937.87. (R. 808-09; 
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also Addendum Exhibit "B"). The lower court denied post-trial 
motions filed by the Rio Grande seeking, in the alternative, a 
new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or an 
alteration or amendment of the judgment. (R. 906; also 
Addendum Exhibit "C"). 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Rio Grande's main line tracks are crossed by a 
narrow, infrequently travelled, country road at 1600 South in 
Springville, Utah (R. 1244). In this area of Utah County, the 
railroad's tracks run generally in a north-south direction and, 
as can be seen from the numerous photographic exhibits, the 
grade for these tracks was established by making a long cut 
through a hillside which extends several hundred yards to the 
north from 1600 South. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 2A-2G, 
2I-2M, 47, and 48; Defendant's Trial Exhibits 22-33, and 41). 
This hillside causes a substantial obstruction of the view that 
an eastbound motorist has of a train coming from the north, 
but, since the hill essentially ends at 1600 South, an 
eastbound motorist's view to his right, or south, is relatively 
unobstructed (R. 1739). The top of the hillside, including 
portions which were on the railroad right of way, had weeds 
growing on it. The train in this instance was southbound and, 
since plaintiff was eastbound at the time, it approached the 
crossing from plaintiff's left. The train was travelling at 50 
mph and there was no claim that this speed exceeded any speed 
limits imposed by either governmental entities or the railroad 
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itself. The crossing had the usual round yellow sign with a 
cross on it to provide an advance warning to motorists of the 
upcoming railroad crossing, and the usual crossbucks at the 
point of the crossing to denote its location. In addition, 
this crossing had a stop sign (R. 1749). 
Plaintiff Robert L. Gleave testified that he was 
driving eastbound on 1600 South Street in Springville on the 
morning of April 16, 1982 (R. 1746-48), and that he knew he was 
approaching a railroad crossing on 1600 South Street because he 
had been over these tracks about three other times and because 
he had worked on the crossing itself as part of an asphalt 
paving crew in 1979 (R. 1748 and 1757). There was enough 
daylight so that he was not using his vehicle's headlights (R. 
1748), the window on the driver's side was almost all the way 
up (R. 1749), and the vehicle's heater was on (R. 1743). 
Under direct examination, Mr. Gleave testified that 
his radio was "off" (R. 1749) but, during cross-examination, he 
conceded that he did not know for sure but believed it was off 
(R. 1755). The railroad claim agent who investigated the 
accident testified that when he examined plaintiff's vehicle on 
the morning of the accident, its radio switch was in the "on" 
position (R. 938). 
The plaintiff testified that he saw "all the warning 
signs on the road" as he approached the railroad crossing (R. 
1749 and 1757). Although he had told the investigating police 
officer that he had only "slowed down" for the stop sign (R. 
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1422), during trial he testified that he came to a complete 
stop at the stop sign. (R. 1749). He further testified that 
while stopped at the stop sign, he looked to the left (north) 
and saw no train approaching (R. 1749). A video tape prepared 
by plaintiff's expert, and offered into evidence by the 
plaintiff, demonstrated that the headlights and the top of a 
train approaching from the north at 50 mph could be seen even 
by a motorist stopped at the stop sign for approximately six 
seconds, but, from that point on the roadway, the view of the 
rest of the train was substantially obstructed by the 
hillside. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 47.) The weeds caused 
little additional obstruction, even though the video tape was 
made in June when the weeds would have had an additional two 
months of growth. 
The plaintiff next testified that after stopping at 
the sign and looking left, he then looked to his right (south) 
and that he continued looking to the right as he started up 
from the stop sign towards the tracks (R. 1750). He 
acknowledged that his view to the left (north) was more 
restricted than his view to the right (south), claiming that 
from the stop sign he could see about 900 feet down the tracks 
to his right (south), but only 50-100 feet up the tracks to his 
left (north) (R. 1758-59). Nevertheless, he testified 
unequivocally that he travelled from the stop sign to a point 
where he could no longer stop and avoid the collision while 
looking only to his right (R. 1759-60). He claimed that he 
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heard the train whistle and saw the train as he glanced back to 
his left (north) while his car was moving (R. 1750) and that 
upon seeing and hearing the train, he immediately stopped his 
car (R. 1750). 
The plaintiff further testified that his vehicle 
stopped with its front end about one foot from the west track 
(R. 1750, 1761-62 and 1765), and the train hit his vehicle 
while he was trying to put it into reverse and move it from 
that position (R. 1750). He was not wearing his seatbelt at 
the time of the collision (R. 1750). He testified that he saw 
the train about two or three seconds before the collision (R. 
1750), and that he believes the train would not have hit his 
vehicle i_f he had stopped at the point where his vehicle was 
when he saw the train (R. 1775-76). He was certain that he 
only stopped at the stop sign and at the point where the front 
of his vehicle was when it was impacted by the train (R. 1761, 
1765). He did not stop a second time at a point between the 
stop sign and the tracks, where his view to the left would have 
been unobstructed by the hillside. 
Robert Mitchell, chief of the New Jersey Department of 
Transportation's Grade Crossing Section was called as an expert 
by plaintiff. Mr. Mitchell testified that an eastbound driver 
stopped with his front bumper at the stop sign could see about 
250 feet up the tracks to to the left (north) (R. 1733-34), and 
that it would be "suicidal" for a driver not to pull up closer 
to the tracks to get a better view and stop a second time 
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before proceeding across the tracks (R. 1734). He further 
testified that an eastbound driver who pulls slightly forward 
from the stop sign can see about 430-450 feet up the tracks to 
the left (north); that a driver who pulled forward and stopped 
a second time would be able to see a train approaching the 
crossing from the left (north) for about six seconds, assuming 
the train was travelling at the uncontroverted speed in this 
instance of 50 mph (R. 1734-35); and that it would be 
"foolhardy" for a driver to try to beat the train if it was 
only 450 feet or 6 seconds from the crossing (R. 1735). 
This testimony was in substantial agreement with the 
testimony of experts called by the railroad. The defense 
experts testified that a driver stopped at the stop sign could 
see only 285 feet of track north of the crossing (R. 974), but 
that if a motorist were to pull forward to a point five feet 
from the stop sign, he could see 474 feet of track to the north 
(R. 1361, 1369-70). That point was almost ten feet (116 
inches) from the west rail of the track (R. 1385). The 
railroad's experts agreed with plaintiff's expert, Mr. 
Mitchell, that an eastbound motorist approaching this crossing 
should stop a second time and look to his left (north) before 
proceeding over the tracks (R. 963, 968) and that, since the 
view to the right was relatively unobstructed, a motorist 
proceeding east from the stop sign should be looking to his 
left (north) as he proceeds to the point where his view of the 
tracks in that direction becomes unobstructed (R. 969-71). 
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Plaintiff called Rio Grande train crew member Bruce 
Leek who testified that he was in the cab of the lead engine of 
the train that collided with plaintiff's vehicle (R. 1811). He 
further testified that the subject crossing is not visible from 
the train at a point one-quarter mile north of the crossing 
because of a curve in the track (R. 1812). He first saw 
plaintiff's vehicle creeping toward the crossing about nine 
seconds before the collision (R. 1813), and he saw plaintiff 
stop with the nose of his automobile on the west rail for about 
4 or 5 seconds before the automobile disappeared from his view 
under the nose of the engine shortly before the impact (R. 
1815). He testified that the train had a "very loud" whistle 
and that the train's engineer sounded the whistle continuously 
from the quarter mile whistle post north of the 1600 South 
crossing until he interrupted the normal signal with an 
emergency blowing of the whistle that continued until the train 
impacted the automobile (R. 1817-1818; and 1822). The train 
was travelling 50 mph at the time of the collision (R. 1818) 
and he thought the plaintiff could have made it across the 
subject crossing without being hit by the train (R. 1823 and 
1826). 
Plaintiff also called the train engineer, Gerald H. 
Burton. Mr. Burton testified that the train was travelling at 
50 mph, which was the designated speed for this train (R. 1396 
and 1397). He saw the plaintiff's vehicle move slowly onto 
the tracks and stop (R. 1401-02) and, at that point in time, he 
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interrupted the normal whistle signal to blow the whistle in 
rapid succession (R. 1402). He testified that the photograph 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit 27 (which depicts the lead engine 
of a train 474 feet from the crossing (R. 1374)) shows an 
engine in the approximate location where he was when he first 
saw the plaintiff's vehicle. (R. 1404-05). He believed that 
the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped on the rail for about three 
to four seconds before the accident (R. 1409), and he thought 
the plaintiff had adequate time to remove his vehicle from the 
tracks in order to prevent the accident (R. 1412). 
The plaintiff also called Sergeant David Coron of the 
Springville Police Department. Sergeant Coron testified that 
he investigated this accident (R. 1416-17), that he spoke with 
the plaintiff at the scene of the accident (R. 1419), and that 
the plaintiff was lucid at that time (R. 1421-22). He asked 
the plaintiff what had happened and the plaintiff said he 
"slowed down" for the stop sign (R. 1422; also Addendum 
Exhibit "J"). Sergeant Coron believed that the automobile 
driver's failure to stop for the stop sign was the cause of the 
accident (R. 1436). He also testified that in his opinion it 
is reasonable to expect one to stop a second time at a point 
between the stop sign and the tracks to get a better view to 
the north (R. 1445-47). 
Plaintiff's next witness was Robert H. Brey, a Brigham 
Young University associate professor in audiology. Dr. Brey 
testified that his recording equipment first detected railroad 
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whistle sounds when a train was 792 feet from this crossing (R. 
1464). The whistle signal was measured to be audible to a 
human ear, even over the background noise of an automobile, 
when it was at a point that is 467 feet from the crossing 
(about 6.5 seconds at 50 mph) (R. 1465). While he was standing 
at the crossing taking his measurements, he was able to hear 
train whistles from all over the city of Springville, even 
whistles one to two miles from the crossing (R. 1477). He 
could actually hear train whistles at the 1600 South crossing 
before the sound would register on the meter he was using to 
make his measurements (R. 1487). Finally, he stated that in 
his opinion, it would be pretty stupid to stop on the track if 
you heard train whistles in the distance, even if you did not 
know the exact location or direction of the train (R. 1492). 
Plaintiff's next witness was Wayne T. Van Wagoner. 
Mr. Van Wagoner testified as an expert that an eastbound driver 
with his bumper at the stop sign has a sight distance of 
approximately 285 feet to the north (R. 1609), that the whistle 
on the train would give a driver at the crossing an additional 
warning of the approaching train if the driver heard the whistle 
(R. 1610), and that, given the visual limitations at the 
subject crossing, he agreed that the stop sign should have been 
there (R. 1628-29). He believed the advance warning of the 
railroad crossing was adequate at the subject crossing (R. 
1631), and he testified that the State of Utah ultimately 
determines whether the crossing protection at any given 
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railroad crossing should be upgraded and that this decision is 
based upon a State "hazard index" (R. 1333-34). 
The Rio Grande called as a witness Mr. Arthur Geurts, 
Safety Studies Engineer for UDOT. Mr. Geurts testified that he 
was responsible for UDOT's hazard index rating for all railroad 
crossings in the State of Utah (R. 981). The 1600 South 
crossing was one of 1280 crossings studied by the state and the 
Federal Railroad Administration. The Federal Railroad 
Administration initially and incorrectly ranked it as the 68th 
most dangerous among the 1280 crossings. In computing this 
ranking, the Federal Railroad Administration believed that 
train speeds in the area were 70 mph (R. 989-91). Mr. Geurts 
testified that train speeds through this crossing are only TO 
mph and, by assuming 50 mph for the speed of trains in the area 
instead of 70 mph, the ranking of this crossing under the UDOT 
hazard index was changed from the 68th most dangerous to the 
353rd most dangerous of the 1280 crossings surveyed (R. 982, 
989-91). Moreover, Mr. Geurts explained that this UDOT 
evaluation was done before the stop signs were installed, 
which, of course, provided a motorist with additional crossing 
protection and reduced the hazard (R. 983). In determining 
what crossing protection to require at a particular crossing, 
Mr. Geurts explained that UDOT considers factors such as a 
motorist's sight distance at the crossing, the speed and number 
of trains in the area, and the speed and volume of highway 
traffic at the crossing (R. 985-87). 
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The plaintiff called Mr. Joseph Bruce Yuhas, who was 
an employee of UDOT that participated in the survey of the 1600 
South crossing in October of 1974. Mr. Yuhas testified that 
the survey team considered factors such as the sight distances 
and, after fully evaluating the crossing, it recommended 
federal funds be sought to install flashing light signals as 
additional crossing protection (R. 1247-49). The team further 
recommended that stop signs be installed until federal funds 
for flashing signals became available (R. 1241, 1258-59). 
Sometime after this survey, the stop signs were installed. 
Obviously, much more evidence was adduced during 
trial, but space limitations do not permit the recitation of 
all of the evidence, and the facts essential to this appeal 
have been enumerated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because 
the evidence to support the verdict of no negligence on 
plaintiff's part is completely lacking or is so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust. 
2. The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial for the 
reason that the Rio Grande was deprived of its due process 
right to trial by an impartial jury by virtue of the 
undisclosed doctor-patient relationship between juror Edna 
Argyle and plaintiff's treating physician and witness Dr. John 
Mendenhall. 
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3. The Court should order a new trial because the 
lower court erred in the denial of the Rio Grande's pretrial 
motion for partial summary judgment. The Legislature has 
vested exclusive authority over the design and protection of 
railroad crossings in the hands of the Utah Department of 
Transportation, subject only to review by the Utah Public 
Service Commission. 
4. The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because 
of plaintiff counsel's surprise and improper use during closing 
arguments of the testimony of witness Willis Woodard. 
5. The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because 
it was error for the lower court to deny the Rio Grande's 
requested Jury Instruction No. 25, which would have instructed 
the jury that it could consider whether the plaintiff failed to 
mitigate his damages by not wearing his seatbelt. 
6. The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because 
it was error for the lower court to dismiss co-defendant UDOT 
prior to trial on the grounds of sovereign immunity. Even if 
this Court determines that the designation of a traffic control 
device at a railroad crossing constitutes a "governmental 
function," UDOT still should not have been dismissed because 
said work does not constitute a "discretionary function" 




THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
AND THE JURY VERDICT FINDING THE PLAINTIFF TO 
HAVE NO DEGREE OF FAULT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED. 
Although the railroad believes it was not negligent in 
this instance, such a conclusion is not necessary for a new 
trial to be required. Similarly, this Court need not conclude 
the negligence of the plaintiff to have been equal to or 
greater than any negligence of the railroad in order to resolve 
this appeal. In this instance, a jury found there to be no 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. If this Court 
concludes the evidence insufficient to support such a finding, 
if the plaintiff was only 1% negligent, this case must be 
remanded for a new trial. 
Facts disputed by the plaintiff support a finding that 
this accident resulted when the plaintiff ran a stop sign. 
However, even if one were to ignore the investigating officer's 
testimony concerning what the plaintiff told him immediately 
after the accident, even if one were to accept completely the 
testimony of the plaintiff, one is at most presented with facts 
which have been held consistently by this Court to constitute 
negligence as a matter of law. 
According to the plaintiff, he knew on that clear 
April morning that he was approaching a railroad crossing. 
Indeed, he had been part of a paving crew that laid asphalt at 
this crossing. (R. 1748 and 1757). He saw all of the warning 
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signs and he saw the stop sign. Even if he did stop for the 
sign, his duty to yield the right of way to a train was only 
beginning. 
The obvious purpose of the stop sign at this crossing 
is to force a motorist to stop before proceeding into the zone 
of danger that is incidental to this crossing. It is not there 
to enable a motorist to disregard the crossing itself and any 
trains in the area, so long as he stops for the sign. The 
testimony of all witnesses agreed that an eastbound motorist 
stopped at the stop sign had a severely obstructed view to the 
north, or the driver's left. The view to the motorist's right 
was relatively unobstructed. It was also beyond dispute that a 
motorist pulling forward from the stop sign would reach a point 
where the view to his left (north) would become unobstructed 
and, at that point, his vehicle would still be clear of any 
danger from a passing train. Even the plaintiff admitted that 
had his vehicle been stopped when he first saw the train, 
rather than moving forward, he would have avoided the collision 
(R. 1775-76). 
Had the plaintiff pulled forward slowly enough to stop 
as soon as the view to his left became unobstructed, this 
accident would not have happened. Such conduct is what the law 
requires, and it is the crossing itself which requires such 
conduct, not the stop sign. The stop sign requires a motorist 
to stop at the sign; the crossing itself requires him to 
control his vehicle and, if necessary, stop it at the point 
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where he can see that no train is within dangerous proximity t 
the crossing. 
"The law requires that a traveler, approaching a 
railroad crossing, look and listen, and, if 
necessary, stop to avoid being injured by 
trains. This is his duty at all times and on 
all occasions, whether his view be obstructed or 
unobstructed, and the greater the hazard or 
danger surrounding him, the greater is the care 
required of him ." Lundguist v. Kennecott 
Copper Co., Inc. 30 Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (1973) (emphasis added). See also, 
Steele v. D&RGW 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 
754 (1964). Benson v. D&RGW, 4 Utah 2d 38, 
41-42 286 P.2d 790, 792 (1955). 
According to the plaintiff, he not only failed to sto 
for the train, he drove forward from the stop sign while 
looking to his right, the direction which had an unobstructed 
view for about 900 feet down the track (R. 1759). At the stop 
sign, the plaintiff knew there was no train to his right 
because his view in that direction was unobstructed. From his 
own testimony, he also knew that from there he could not see 
more than 1-0 feet up the track to his left (R. 1759). He the 
pulled forward looking to his rjLght (R. 1750). It is only 
after he could no longer stop short of the tracks, that he 
"glanced back to the left" and saw the train (R. 1750). 
This testimony only permits two possible conclusions: 
Either the plaintiff rolled through the stop sign glancing 
left, then right, then left again without stopping and at an 
unsafe rate of speed, or he stopped and proceeded slowly with 
his eyes glued to his right for an inordinately long period of 
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time when any danger had to come from his left. Such conduct 
has been held by this Court to be negligent as a matter of law. 
Unlike the plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in 
Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 
1182 (1973), was travelling toward an unfamiliar crossing. 
Just as in this case, the view to his left, which was also 
north, was "obstructed by an embankment." 30 Utah 2d at 
263-64, 516 P.2d at 1183. 
"He testified that as he proceeded to the 
crossing he looked north and observed nothing 
since the embankment extended approximately 10 
feet north of the crossing. He looked in a 
southerly direction, where his view was 
unobstructed, and he saw nothing. As he looked 
to the north again the train and vehicle 
collided." Id. 
The embankment which obstructed the driver's view to his left 
extended to within 10 feet of the crossing, but, as here, the 
plaintiff in Lundquist conceded that there was sufficient 
space prior to crossing the tracks where a vehicle could stop, 
and where the driver vould have a view up tht tracks to see a 
train approaching from his left (north). 
Even without the presence of a stop sign and even 
though the Lundquist plaintiff was unfamiliar with the 
crossing, the trial court found him negligent as a matter of 
law. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the railroad track 
itself was a sufficient warning to require the plaintiff to 
proceed to a point where his view was unobstructed and either 
stop or so control his vehicle that a collision with any 
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oncoming train could be avoided. The summary judgment was 
affirmed; the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. 
In the case of Steele v. The Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964), the 
plaintiff mistakenly proceeded onto a construction site where a 
viaduct was being built over railroad tracks. The point where 
the temporary dirt road through the construction site crossed 
the railroad tracks contained none of the usual railroad 
crossing signs, although there was a sign which proclaimed 
those entering the property to be trespassers. 
A dirt "embankment" obscured vision at the 
construction site, but the Supreme Court noted that the 
motorist's "visibility was not obscured by the fill embankment 
or any other condition within 10 feet of the track [and the 
motorist] proceeded onto the track without stopping or 
observing the approaching train." 396 P.2d at 753 (emphasis 
added). Although the operator of the automobile in Steele 
claimed to be distracted by the hustle and bustle of the 
construction site, the lower court found him negligent as a 
matter of law7 and dismissed his action. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed. 
Finally, in Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
Ill Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947), a plaintiff claimed weeds 
and trees limited her view of an oncoming train to 100 feet up 
the track. The crossing involved in the Drummond case was 
protected by what the Court described as an "automatic signal 
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bell,f which the plaintiff said she stopped "alongside", even 
though she claimed it was not ringing. Ill Utah at 292, 177 
P.2d at 904. It was from this point that she asserted her view 
to be obstructed. She claimed the road bed from the point 
adjacent to the automatic signal bell to the crossing to have 
been unusually rough and that this condition occupied her 
attention until she was too close to the tracks to avoid the 
collision. For the purpose of the appeal, the Supreme Court 
assumed that the automatic crossing signal malfunctioned and 
that the railroad was negligent. Nevertheless, it affirmed the 
lower court's finding that the plaintiff was negligent as a 
matter of law. 
"Having been fully aware of the conditions 
confronting her in driving over this crossing, if 
the road was such that it interfered with the 
opportunity of looking while the car was in 
motion, plaintiff could have stopped her car 
closer to the track where visibility would have 
been better and road conditions much less 
important. . . The failure of the signal bell 
was an invitation to her to proceed with due 
care, but was not an invitation to proceed 
without regard to other dangerous conditions then 
existing that could have been ascertained by the 
use of ordinary care." Ill Utah at 299-300, 177 
P.2d at 908 (emphasis added). 
It is interesting that the Supreme Court in Drummond 
noted that one could see the top of the train over the top of 
the weeds. In the present case, the plaintiff's own video tape 
demonstrated that the tjsp of the train could be seen for 
several hundred feet up the track to the driver's left (north) 
even at the point where a driver must stop for the stop sign. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 47). 
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Just as Mr. Gleave now claims, the plaintiff in 
Drummond claimed she stopped at the point of a stop signal and 
from that point her view was obstructed. Then because the 
electronic sign indicated a clear track and because the road 
condition occupied her attention, she argued she should be 
exonerated in proceeding over the crossing without again 
stopping and looking for an approaching train. The trial court 
and the Supreme Court disagreed, finding such conduct negligent 
as a matter of law. 
"The time to look is when he is about to cross. 
That is the time when he is about to encounter 
the danger portended by a railroad crossing, and 
it is not enough that he look at a point some 
distance from the crossing when looking on nearer 
approach would reveal danger." Ill P.2d at 298, 
277 P.2d at 907 (quoting from Chicago, R.I.&P.R. 
Co. v. Wheeler, 80 Kan. 187, 101 P. 1001 (1909). 
In the present case, there is no claim of an 
electronic signal failure, no claim of unfamiliarity with the 
area, and no claim of construction work or other activity to 
distract a motorist's attention. If the plaintiff in Drummond 
had to stop a second time, then so did Mr. Gleave. If the 
unmarked tracks in Steele required the plaintiff in that case 
to stop within 10 feet of them in order to see around an 
embankment, then the crossbucks at 1600 South in Springville 
required no less of Mr. Gleave. If the plaintiff in Lundquist 
was negligent in looking mostly to the right as he approached a 
crossing with an obstructed view to the left, then so was Mr. 
Gleave. 
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Very good reasons exist for granting railroad trains 
the "unquestioned right of way" over automobiles at railroad 
crossings. Pippy v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 79 Utah 
439, 451, 1 P.2d 305, 310 (1932). Trains confine their 
movements to the tracks, they are enormously heavy and 
difficult to stop, they cannot swerve to avoid a collision and 
they are certified as a public necessity anc' convenience. See 
e.g., Lundguist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 
P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973). 
"If a traveler, by looking, could have seen an 
approaching train in time to escape, it will be presumed, in 
case he is injured by collision, either that he did not look, 
or, if he did look, that he did not heed what he saw. Such 
conduct is held negligence per se." Wilkinson v. Oregon 
Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 116, 99 P. 466, 468 (1909) 
(citing Mann v. Belt Railroad & Stock-Yard Co., 128 Ind. 138, 
142, 26 N.E. 819, 820 (1891)). Accord, Benson v. The Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 28 6 P.2d 
790, 792 (1955); Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103 
Utah 274, 282, 135 P.2d 115, 119 (1943). 
Plaintiff's own expert testified that the train would 
have been plainly visible from a point of safety beyond the 
stop sign (R. 1609), and the photographic exhibits clearly 
demonstrate this fact (R. 1373, 1380, and defendant's Exhibits 
27-33). The plaintiff testified that had he been stopped where 
he was when he first saw the train, the collision would not 
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have occurred (R. 1775-76). Plaintiff's video tape (Exhibit 
No. 47) undeniably shows that a motorist stopped with the front 
of his vehicle at the stop sign can see the headlight and the 
top of a train approaching from the north (left) at 50 mph for 
at least six seconds. Even disregarding the train whistle, the 
bell, and Mr. Gleave's confession to the police officer, he 
simply did not see what was there to be seen from a point of 
safety. He violated the train's right of way, he ignored the 
crossbucks and the tracks, and he drove to a point of danger 
without even looking in the direction from which the danger 
must come. 
This Court has stated that a new trial must be ordered 
if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking 
or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 
P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). See also, Anderson v. Bradley, 
590 P. 2d 339, 342 (Utah 1979), and Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 
2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (1958). In this instance, not only is the 
evidence to support a finding of no negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff "unconvincing," even the plaintiff's own version 
of the facts compels the conclusion that he was negligent as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
RIO GRANDE WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS DUE PROCESS RIGHT 
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
Perhaps the most fundamental precept of our system of 
trial by jury is the requirement that each and every member of 
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the jury be impartial. Despite voir dire, no one discovered 
until after the trial that Juror Edna Argyle was so 
well-acquainted with the plaintiff's witness, Dr. John 
Mendenhall, that the Rio Grande did not enjoy its due process 
right to an impartial jury. 
This Court has stated that it is appropriate to order 
a new trial when the voir dire of the prospective jurors fails 
in its basic purpose of eradicating juror bias. In Anderton v. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980), the Court stated: 
"Trial by jury in civil cases is guaranteed 
under the Utah Constitution. Moreover the 
requirements of due process dictate that the jury 
be impartial and unbiased. It is in furtherance 
of these rights that voir dire examination of 
prospective jurors before the beginning of trial 
is engaged in. For the same reason, a trial 
court may order a new trial should it appear that 
juror bias crept into the proceedings 
notwithstanding voir dire questioning." 607 
P.2d at 835 (emphasis added). 
As confirmed by the Affidavit of Edna Argyle (R. 
779-800; also Addendum Exhibit "I"), Dr. Mendenhall surgically 
implanted artificial knees in Juror Argyle. Juror Argyle first 
became aware that her physician was going to be a witness when 
he took the stand to testify as part of the plaintiff's case. 
Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11 4. Juror Argyle did not notify 
the Court or the parties of her relationship with this witness 
until after the trial was over. Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11 
5. The transcript of the voir dire (R. 1659-60) confirms 
paragraph 2 of Juror Argyle's Affidavit that plaintiff's 
counsel did not mention Dr. Mendenhall as a prospective witness 
-24-
during the voir dire of the jury. Juror bias crept into the 
proceeding because plaintiff's counsel failed to identify all 
of his witnesses when asked to do so by the Court. 
The relationship between Juror Argyle and Witness 
Mendenhall was not a casual or insignificant acquaintance. 
Rather, Dr. Mendenhall was Edna Argyle's personal physician and 
surgeon. Edna Argyle trusted and respected Dr. Mendenhall so 
much that she was willing to allow him to perform major surgery 
on her. Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11 3. Although she 
presumably tried to ignore her special relationship with one of 
plaintiff's key witnesses, the appearance and possibility of 
bias is too great to ignore. 
In Anderton, supra, this Court stated: 
"The evil to be avoided in any relationship 
between juror and counsel is that of improper 
bias or prejudice, which arises, not from the 
fact of the relationship itself, but only from an 
awareness thereof. Mr. Huber [i.e., the juror] 
can hardly be suspected of inclining toward the 
representations of Mr. Nebeker [i.e. the defense 
counsel] due to a relationship existing between 
the two of them of which neither was aware until 
after the trial had finished. For this reason, 
impartiality of the jury was undiminished by the 
relationship, and no prejudicial error 
occurred". 607 P.2d at 835 (emphasis added). 
This Court in Anderton implied that a relationship 
between a lawyer for one of the parties and a juror would be 
prejudicial if the juror was aware of the relationship during 
the trial. A close relationship between a juror and the 
plaintiff's principal physician seems no less significant. 
Juror Argyle certainly was aware of her relationship with Dr. 
-25-
Mendenhall while he was testifying on behalf of the plaintiff 
and she exhibited this awareness while she was deliberating, as 
indicated by her testimony that she mentioned the fact of her 
relationship with the doctor to her fellow jurors. See 
Affidavit of Edna Argyle at UU 4 and 6. This compounded the 
problem. The effect this had upon other jurors in their 
deliberation can only increase the appearance of bias in this 
case. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), the 
defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated robbery. The 
Brooks case explains why a juror cannot be "impartial11 when 
the juror accords one of the parties 1 witnesses particular 
respect or esteem. 
"Impartiality" is not a technical conception but 
is a state of mind; it is a mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference. . . A juror, who 
through personal association with a witness or 
party has developed a relationship of affection, 
respect, or esteem cannot be deemed disinter-
ested, indifferent, impartial. 
k7h ? r e t he r e have been per so n aJl ass ociations , 
such a s _ _t h e^__o ne here, to remain uni n f luenced , 
unbiased, and unprejudiced; runs counter to 
liyinAn J}^1^11^- 0 n e cannot be deemed indifferent 
and impartial." 563 P.2d at 801-02 (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Even if, arguendo, Juror Argyle consciously tried to 
be unbiased and impartial, it would be against her human nature 
for her to ignore the fact that a person very highly regarded 
by her had come forward as a witness in plaintiff's behalf. 
Under such circumstances, Juror Argyle cannot be deemed to have 
been "disinterested, indifferent, impartial." 
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The Rio Grande and Utah Railway were each given three 
peremptory challenges. However, they only exercised five of 
their possible six peremptories. Even if Juror Argyle had 
survived a challenge for cause, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway 
could have exercised their sixth peremptory challenge on her. 
Moreover, since there was an alternate juror who could have 
replaced Juror Argyle, plaintiff counsel's mistake during voir 
dire could have been corrected when Dr. Mendenhall came forward 
to testify, but Juror Argyle chose not to inform the court of 
her relationship with this witness. 
Juror Argyle's vote was undeniably important to the 
jury's verdict. When polled, only six of the eight jurors 
joined in the finding that plaintiff was 0% negligent; Juror 
Argyle was one of the six. (R. 1181-82). Of course, the Rio 
Grande would be entitled to a new trial even if Juror Argyle 
had joined in a unanimous verdict. See, Crawford v. Manning, 
542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). 
This Court can determine by logic, based upon common 
experience, that Mrs. Argyle's intimate association as a 
patient of one of plaintiff's key witnesses prevented her from 
standing in an "attitude of indifference" between plaintiff and 
defendants. Juror Argyle subconsciously or even consciously 
associated her feelings of esteem for Dr. Mendenhall with the 
merits of plaintiff's case. Under such circumstances, even a 
statement by a juror that she intends to be fair loses its 
meaning. See, Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
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1981). "The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications; 
this function is the responsibility of the trial court." See 
also, State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 882-84 (Utah 1981). 
Although a new trial will involve some additional 
expense and inconvenience to the parties, such must be borne to 
preserve and protect the constitutional right to a trial by an 
impartial jury. The Rio Grande still has not had its day in 
court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE IT WAS 
ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DENY THE RIO 
GRANDE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 
THE RIO GRANDE OWES NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO 
PERFORM FUNCTIONS EXCLUSIVELY PREEMPTED BY UDOT 
AND UPSC. 
Before trial, the Rio Grande moved for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to submit 
to the jury a theory that the Rio Grande owed him a duty to 
redesign the landscape at the 1600 South crossing, provide 
additional warning devices at the crossing, or slow its trains 
to a speed below that which UDOT understood was the speed of 
trains in this area (R. 460-63; 501-03; 2110-11; 2139-40). The 
lower court denied this motion (R. 569-70; 769-71; also 
2 
Addendum Exhibit ,fD"). 
The Rio Grande also moved unsuccessfully for a new 
trial based on the same grounds. (R. 825; 906). 
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It was undisputed that UDOT evaluated the subject 
crossing and took all of the factors extant at the crossing 
into account in discharging its statutory obligation to mandate 
the crossing protection at that location. These factors 
included the obstructed view caused by the hillside and the 
rate of travel of trains through the crossing. Arthur Geurts, 
the Safety Studies Engineer for UDOT, testified that UDOT 
considers many factors at each railroad crossing, including but 
not limited to the volume and speed of both train and 
automobile traffic, the number of tracks, the gradients in the 
area, and the various sight distances (R. 981-92). See also 
the testimony of Joseph Bruce Yuhas (R. 1236-37). After UDOT 
evaluated all of the circumstances relevant to highway safety 
at the 1600 South crossing, UDOT, pursuant to state law, 
determined what warning devices were reasonable and appropriate 
under those circumstances. The Rio Grande does not have any 
legal authority, and thus no duty, to second-guess UDOT. As 
such, it was error to allow the plaintiff to suggest to the 
jury that the Rio Grande breached a common law duty owed to 
plaintiff by not reshaping the contour of the earth in the 
vicinity of the crossing and/or by not slowing its trains (R. 
1113-14; 1155-56). 
A• The Statutory Framework 
A series of related statutes in Chapter 4 of Title 54 
of the Utah Code establish UDOT's authority to control traffic 
safety at railroad crossings in Utah, subject only to UPSC 
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review. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(1) (1953, as amended) 
provides that a railroad-highway crossing cannot be built 
"without the permission of the department of transportation 
[UDOT] having first been secured" and that the department 
"shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant i 
upon such terms and conditions as rt may prescribe." Id. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) 
(1953, as amended) provides: 
"The department [UDOT] shall i.cve the power 
to determine and prescribe the manner, including 
the particular point of crossing, and the terms 
of installation, operation, maintenance, use and 
protection of each crossing . . . of a public 
road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, 
. . . and to alter or abolish any such crossing 
. . . and the proportions in which the expense of 
the alteration or abolition of such crossings . . 
. shall be divided between the railroad or 
between such corporations and the state, county, 
municipality or other public authority in 
interest." (Emphasis added). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(4), the Utah 
Public Service Commission ("UPSCM) "shall retain exclusive 
jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute by any person 
aggrieved by any action of the department [UDOT]" taken 
pursuant to Section 54-4-15. I_d. (Emphasis added). 
The statewide duty of UDOT to regulate safety signa 
or devices at railroad-highway crossings is expressly stated 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1: 
"The department of transportation so as to 
promote the public safety shall as prescribed in 
this act provide for the installing, maintaining, 
reconstructing, and improving of automatic and 
other safety appliances, signals or devices at 
-30-
grade crossings on public highways or roads over 
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad 
corporation in the state.ft (Emphasis added). 
Moreover, Section 54-4-15.3 provides that UDOT ffshall 
apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices 
described in section 54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street 
railroad and the public agency involved." Section 54-4-15.4 
separately requires that the "department of transportation 
shall provide in its annual budget for the costs incurred" to 
install signals or other safety devices at railroad crossings. 
B
• The Authority of UDOT to Regulate Railroad 
Crossings Is Exclusive. 
Presumably, at the time when only horsedrawn vehicles 
and early "horseless carriages" crossed over railroad tracks, 
the railroads themselves installed whatever signs they chose to 
at these crossings. One can safely assume the crossing 
protection signs of that era offered little consistency to the 
highway traveller but, of course, the speed and range of 
highway travel was substantially different from what it is 
today. In Utah, as elsewhere, government became increasingly 
involved in the regulation of highway traffic as the speed and 
number of vehicles increased. In 1917, the Utah Legislature 
enacted the predecessor of Section 15-4-15, and at that time 
the predecessor of the Utah Public Service Commission [UPSC] 
was granted: " . . . the exclusive power to determine and 
prescribe the manner . . . and the terms of installation, 
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operation, maintenance, use and protection . . . of each 
crossing of a public road or a highway." Laws of Utah 1917, § 
47-4-14. (Emphasis added). 
This language was held by the Utah Supreme Court to 
mean just what it says in The Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 51 Utah 
623, 172 Pac. 479 (1918), and later in Provo City v. 
Department of Business Regulation, et al. 118 Utah 2d 1, 218 
P.2d 675 (1950). On both occasions, the power of the 
designated state agency to "determine and prescribe" railroad 
crossings was held to be exclusive. One limited area of joint 
city and state jurisdiction remained. Prior to 1978, Utrl. Code 
Ann. § 41-6-96 (1953) authorized cities to erect stop si, : at 
railroad crossings within city limits, if they determined jch 
to be necessary. In 1978, this statute was repealed and even 
this limited authority by a local government was abolished. 
The legislative intent could not be more clear. Neither 
railroads nor even local governments have the power to 
prescribe what is to exist at public railroad crossings. This 
activity, including the determination and prescription of a~iy 
signs or other devices installed to offer "protection" to a 
motorist approaching such crossings, is to be done exclusively 
by a state agency. 
Section 54-4-15 was amended in 1975 in conjunction 
with the creation of UDOT, which assumed some of the UPSC's 
duties regarding railroad crossing safety. The only purpose 
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of the amendment was to substitute references to UDOT for the 
prior references in the statutes to the UPSC. See 6A Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-4-15, Compiler's Notes (Supp. 1983). A fourth 
subsection was added to retain ultimate jurisdiction in the 
UPSC to review the actions of UDOT. The word "exclusive" was 
transferred from the second subsection to the new fourth 
subsection so as to accommodate the new scheme under which UDOT 
has initial jurisdiction over railroad crossing protection, 
subject to review only by the UPSC. The joint jurisdiction of 
these state agencies over the signs and control devices at 
railroad crossings remains exclusive and a private party, such 
as a railroad, has no more right to change the traffic 
protection signs at a public railroad crossing, than it would 
3 
to change any other signs on a public highway. 
The trial court ultimately recognized the exclusive nature 
of UDOT's authority to design the crossing and mandate the 
signs and devices which afford protection to motorists 
approaching the crossing, although, as discussed in the 
following text of Point III C, he incorrectly limited the scope 
of this ruling. See Instruction 13, attached hereto as 
Addendum Exhibit "0" and the text, infra. Although the Utah 
Supreme Court has not been asked to consider the exclusive 
nature of UDOTfs authority over railroad crossings since the 
1975 amendment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, much litigation has 
occurred in the United States District Court of Utah concerning 
this issue and the federal district judges of this state have 
uniformly interpreted Utah law to preclude railroads and local 
governments from any authority or duty to change the crossing 
protection at public crossings. See, e^g^, the Order of 
Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in D&RGW v. West Jordan Municipal 
Corp., Civil No. 82-0344(D. Utah May 28, 1982), "attached 
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "R"; the Order of Chief Judge Aldon 
J. Anderson in Bellon v. D&RGW, Civil No. C83-0888A (D. Utah 
Sept. 8, 1984), attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "Q"; and 
the Order of Judge David K. Winder in Harsin v. D&RGW, Civil 
No. C-83-0993W (D. Utah Jan. 10, 1985)"attached hereto as 
Addendum Exhibit "K". 
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C. Any Change of Train Speeds or Sight Distances 
Requires Reconsideration of the Crossing 
Protection. 
Since the mandated crossing protection is determined 
by UDOT from factors such as view obstructions and train 
speeds, any change of those factors presumably would require 
new UDOT evaluation and perhaps different crossing protection. 
The Rio Grande could not remove the hillside at 1600 South, 
even if that were feasible, without notifying UDOT so that it 
could come out and re-evaluate the crossing protection, since 
it was the obstructed view caused by the hillside, among other 
factors, which led UDOT to mandate the particular traffic signs 
which existed at this crossing. A similar situation exists 
with respect to changes in train speeds in the area. 
In determining how highway traffic is to be regulated, 
UDOT operates with the twin goals of traffic flow efficiency 
and traffic safety. To some extent, these goals are inherently 
inconsistent. For example, if the speed limit on Utah?s 
interstate highways were reduced from 55 mph to 25 mph, they no 
doubt would be safer, but the effect upon traffic flow 
efficiency would be disastrous. It is for this reason that 
traffic control, including the traffic control at any 
particular railroad crossing, is vested exclusively with a 
single state agency. Hopefully, this will result in some 
consistency so that a motorist will confront the same type of 
signs or other warning devices at crossings with essentially 
the same type of hazards, regardless of who owns the railroad 
tracks. Changing the hazard rating of a crossing, either by 
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erecting structures which obstruct the motorists' view of the 
tracks or by removing them, without changing the crossing 
protection, subverts the purpose of the Legislature every bit 
as much as changing the signs. 
The same is true with respect to changes in the speed 
of trains passing through any particular crossing. A crossing 
which the State, in its exercise of exclusive authority, 
determines to be properly protected by a simple crossbuck sign, 
may require flashing lights and gates if the railroad decides 
to raise the speed of its trains in the area from 50 to 90 
mph. Conversely, the goals of traffic flow efficiency and 
state-wide uniformity may have resulted in UDOT removing the 
rather extraordinary measure of a stop sign at the 1600 South 
crossing if the railroad had reduced the speed of its trains in 
4 
that area to something below 50 mph. 
The point to be made is that the exclusive authority 
and duty to determine crossing protection is inextricably tied 
to the factors upon which those decisions are made. The 
railroad certainly had a duty not to change those factors so as 
to make the crossing more dangerous than UDOT thought it was 
when it determined the existing crossing protection. See e.g. 
The UDOT Safety Engineer, Arthur Geurts, testified, for 
example, that nothing more than a 20 mph change in the speed of 
trains in the area (from 70 mph to 50 mph) would change the 
hazard rating of this particular crossing from one that would 
rank it as the 68th most dangerous crossing to one that would 
rank it 353rd most dangerous (R. 982,989-91). 
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Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 
163 (1951). Had it done so, it undoubtedly would have been 
obligated to inform UDOT of the change. Similarly, if the 
railroad chose to do something to make the 1600 South crossing 
more safe, such as reduce its train speeds, it would have been 
obligated to so inform UDOT, so that changes in the crossing 
protection could be considered by the State agency. However, 
so long as the railroad was operating at the speeds which UDOT 
evaluated in determining the crossing protection for motorists 
such as Mr. Gleave, and so long as the motorists' view at 1600 
South was not obstructed by the railroad any more than UDOT 
understood it to be when it evaluated the crossing, then the 
railroad violated no duty owed to motorists approaching that 
crossing. The agency with the exclusive authority and duty to 
establish the appropriate protection for motorists had 
evaluated those factors in determining what protection would be 
afforded to motorists approaching that crossing. The railroad 
had no duty to change those factors. Indeed, it had a duty 
not to change them. 
The lower court recognized the exclusive authority of 
UDOT to determine the design of the crossing and the crossing 
In Toomer, a temporary hazard, unknown to the State 
agency which determined crossing protection, was created by the 
railroad when it parked a large train on a siding and thereby 
blocked the view of the mainline tracks to oncoming motorists. 
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protection at 1600 South. See the first paragraph of 
Instruction No. 13, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "0". 
However, he incorrectly instructed the jury that it could 
consider whether or not the Rio Grande should have exercised 
greater caution in approaching the 1600 South crossing because 
a reasonable man may have thought the crossing protection to be 
inadequate. Instruction No. 6, paragraph (b), attached hereto 
as Addendum Exhibit "P", and the second paragraph of 
Instruction No. 13. 
This suggested that the Rio Grande could second guess 
the State agency and it invited the jury to consider the train 
speed even though there was no claim that the speed of this 
train was in excess of what UDOT expected it to be when it 
determined the crossing protection for this crossing. In 
closing argument, the plaintiff's counsel was permitted to 
argue that the railroad was negligent in not removing the 
hillside to improve a motorist's view of the tracks, and in not 
reducing the speed of its trains (R. 1113-14; 1155-56). This 
was prejudicial error. Since the jury may have determined the 
railroad to be negligent for one of these improper reasons, a 
new trial is required. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF 
PLAINTIFF COUNSEL'S SURPRISE AND IMPROPER 
REFERENCE TO WOODARD'S TESTIMONY IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. 
One of the witnesses called to the stand by plaintiff 
was a man named Willis J. Woodard. Mr. Woodard was a Rio 
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Grande employee who was working on the train which collided 
with plaintiff's vehicle. By the time of trial, Mr. Woodard 
had been fired from his job at the Rio Grande for engaging in, 
and concealing, criminal activities. In fact, Mr. Woodard was 
an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time of trial. 
Plaintiff counsel's direct examination of Mr. Woodard drew a 
strenuous objection by counsel for the Rio Grande when 
plaintiff's counsel began to impeach Mr. Woodard, even though 
Mr. Woodard was plaintiff's own witness and had not said 
anything to surprise plaintiff's counsel. (R. 1788-90) 
Furthermore, based upon written communications received by the 
Rio Grande from Mr. Woodard, it was evident that Mr. Woodard 
had offered to give testimony favorable to the Rio Grande if it 
promised to reemploy him and unfavorable testimony if it 
refused to guarantee him a job at the end of his prison term. 
The Rio Grande had refused to give Mr. Woodard the employment 
he was seeking to extort. (R. 2083-84; also Addendum Exhibit 
tfNM) Because Mr. Woodard could not be trusted to tell the 
truth, the Rio Grande decided not to call him as a witness, 
even though his deposition testimony had been very favorable to 
the railroad. (R. 1789). 
During a lengthy conference outside the presence of 
the jury (R. 1788-1808), it became clear that counsel for the 
plaintiff was aware of Mr. Woodard's attempt to extort a job 
from the Rio Grande even before he called him as a witness (R. 
1791-1792, 1798-99, 2083-89, and Addendum Exhibit "N".) 
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Plaintiff's counsel intended to use Mr. Woodard1s extortion 
communications with the Rio Grande to impeach Mr. Woodard, 
even though Mr. Woodard was a witness who was not to be called 
by the Rio Grande and who, in fact, was being called by the 
plaintiff. 
Ruling on the Rio Grande's objection to plaintiff's 
proposed continued examination of Mr. Woodard, the Court 
ordered plaintiff's counsel to terminate the direct examination 
of Mr. Woodard and he ordered Mr. Woodard to be excused 
immediately from the witness stand. As a result of this order, 
counsel for the Rio Grande, of course, had no opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Woodard. The Rio Grande had no objection to 
dismissing Mr. Woodard from the stand during Mr. Woodard's 
direct testimony (i.e., without cross-examination) because the 
Rio Grande understood that Mr. Woodard's testimony was stricken 
and that counsel for all parties--including plaintiff--would 
not argue any of Mr. Woodard's testimony to the jury. (R. 
1803). 
To the great surprise and detriment of the Rio Grande, 
counsel for the plaintiff did argue to the jury, during the 
rebuttal portion of his closing argument, certain testimony 
given by Mr. Woodard concerning a critical question of the 
litigation (R. 1151-52). Specifically, Mr. Woodard had given 
testimony which could be construed by the jury to mean that the 
Rio Grande's engineer had not sounded the whistle a full 
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one-quarter mile prior the crossing. See Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1975). For the reasons 
stated above, the Rio Grande never had an opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Woodard regarding the estimate of distance 
offered by him as to the point where the engineer first sounded 
the whistle. 
Counsel for the plaintiff improperly called a witness, 
not for his testimony, but merely to impeach him and demon-
strate to the jury that the railroad had employed a "bad man" 
who attempted extortion. Counsel then used the testimony which 
had not been subject to cross-examination as a rebuttal point 
in closing argument. The adequacy of the whistle signal was a 
critical issue for the jury to determine and offering and 
arguing this witness' testimony was prejudicial as well as 
questionable attorney conduct. Since ordinary prudence by the 
Rio Grande could not have guarded against plaintiff counsel's 
surprise use of Mr. Woodard's testimony in his rebuttal 
argument, and since the jury may have based its finding of 
negligence against the Rio Grande on Mr. Woodard's stricken 
testimony, the appropriate remedy is to order a new trial. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE IT WAS 
AN ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT IT COULD CONSIDER WHETHER PLAINTIFF FAILED 
TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES BY NOT WEARING HIS SEAT 
BELT. 
During the trial, plaintiff testified that he was not 
wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. (R. 1750) 
(Tr. 98). Sergeant Coron testified that the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle was structurally intact after the 
collision. (R. 1426-27). The Rio Grande further established 
through the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician that 
substantially all of plaintiff's injuries were consistent with 
injuries sustained by plaintiff upon coming into contact with 
the ground after being thrown from the vehicle. (R. 1209-10). 
At the close of the evidence, the Rio Grande asked for Jury 
Instruction No. 25 which would have instructed the jury that it 
could reduce any damages awarded to plaintiff if it found that 
plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages by not wearing a 
seat belt (R. 702; and Addendum Exhibit "L"). The instruction 
was refused and the Rio Grande took exception to the Court's 
refusal (R. 1159). 
It was error for the trial court to deny this 
instruction. Shortly before trial, the Utah Supreme Court had 
ruled that facts concerning the failure of a plaintiff to 
fasten his seat belt presents an issue of mitigation failure. 
See> Acculog v. Peterson, No. 18133 slip op. (Utah May 1, 
1984). The Rio Grande had introduced sufficient evidence to 
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warrant such an instruction and to argue that theory to the 
jury. The Rio Grande was prejudiced by being prevented from 
arguing that plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages, 
particularly in light of the jury's significant damage award of 
$425,140.00. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS 
DEFENDANT UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ON 
GROUND'S OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Prior to trial, defendant Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
as against UDOT on the grounds that UDOT was immune from suit 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The lower court 
granted UDOT's motion. In so ruling, the lower court stated: 
"The motion of defendant Department of 
Transportation to dismiss is granted. The court 
is of the opinion that the decision of whether or 
not to install a safety signal at a particular 
crossing is a discretionary one protected by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. See also Section 
63-30-22 with respect to punitive damages.'1 
Rulings of Judge Christensen dated May 29, 1984 
(R. at 569-70; also Addendum Exhibit "D"). 
The Rio Grande objected to UD0Tfs Motion to Dismiss on 
the grounds that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act does not 
immunize UDOT from suit under the facts and circumstances of 
this case. (R. 508-513; 769-71; 2134-35) The full text of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act is attached hereto as Addendum 
Exhibit "H". 
The tenth cause of action in plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint alleges that UDOT has the duty under Utah Code Ann. 
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§§ 54-4-14 et^  seg. to install, maintain, reconstruct and 
improve safety devices and signals at the crossing where 
plaintiff had this accident, and that UDOT breached its duty of 
care by failing "to provide for adequate safety signals or 
devices." See Amended Complaint at 1T1T 82-83 (R. at 343-44; 
also Addendum Exhibit "G"). To the extent that plaintiff was 
entitled to submit his case against the Rio Grande to the jury, 
so too were the plaintiff and the Rio Grande entitled to submit 
their respective theories of negligence against UDOT to the 
jury. The lower court completely misunderstood and misapplied 
the sovereign immunity provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act in dismissing UDOT. 
A• Summary of the Two Tier Analytical Framework 
Applicable to Cases Involving the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act 
A claim of governmental immunity in any given case 
presents two questions under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
A c t
- See, e.g., Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 
432, 433-34 (Utah 1981). The first question is whether the 
activity in question constitutes a so-called "governmental 
function." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 provides in pertinent part: 
"Except as may otherwise be provided in this Act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function. . . ." Id. 
If the particular governmental activity does not 
constitute a "governmental function,,f then the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity has no application to the case and the 
plaintiff is entitled to go forward with his action against the 
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governmental entity. Cf., Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban 
Sanitary District, 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984). If, however, the 
activity in question does constitute a "governmental 
function," then the second question is whether the Legislature 
has waived immunity from suit for conduct in connection with 
that specific governmental function. 
B. UDOT'S Regulation of Traffic Warning Devices 
At Railroad Crossings Is Not a "Governmental 
Function" Within the Purview of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and, Therefore, 
UDOT Is Not Immune From Suit 
The lower court improperly dismissed UDOT from this 
proceeding. The installation or failure to install certain 
traffic control devices at a particular railroad crossing is 
not a "governmental function" as that term has been 
consistently defined by the Utah Supreme Court since 1980. In 
the watershed governmental immunity case of Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court declared: 
"We therefore hold that the test for determining 
governmental immunity is whether the activity 
under consideration is of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity. Clearly this standard 
broadens governmental liability." Id. at 
1236-37 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court in Standiford held the operation of 
a public golf course rurt to be a "governmental function" 
within the purview of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
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this Court has expressly adhered to the Standiford definition 
of "governmental function" in several other cases. 
The installation of highway warning devices at 
railroad crossings is not as "of such a unique nature that it 
can only be performed by a governmental agency," and the 
installation of traffic warning devices at railroad crossings, 
while desirable, is not "essential to the core of governmental 
activity." Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37. Although the Rio 
Grande does contend in Point III, supra, that the State has 
elected to preempt the field of railroad crossing protection, 
it could have been otherwise, and it was prior to the time when 
the State preempted the field. Thus, although traffic 
protection at railroad crossings is something the State has 
elected to do exclusively, it is not something that the 
"government alone must do." Johnson, 629 P.2d at 434. 
S^e , e^g^, Thomas v. ClearfieId City, 642 P.2d 737, 
738-39 (Utah 1982) (holding that operation of a municipal sewer 
system is not a "governmental function" within the purview of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act); Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 433-34 (Utah 1981) (holding that 
municipal maintenance of a winter recreational facility was not 
a "governmental function" within the purview of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, and stating, with emphasis in the 
original, that, "The first part of the Standiford test-
activity of such a unique nature that it can only be performed 
by a governmental agency--does not refer to what government 
may do, but to what government alone must do."); See also, 
Comment, De_f in i ng Gov eminent a 1 Func t ion Und e r_ the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 9~ J. CONTEMP. LAW 193, 198-203 
(1983). 
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C. The Lower Court Erroneously Relied On The 
"Discretionary Function" Exception 
The mistake made by the lower court in evaluating the 
sovereign immunity question is that it assumed the installation 
of highway warning devices at a railroad crossings to 
constitute a "governmental function." Rather than focusing 
first on the "governmental function" question, the lower court 
mistakenly assumed the existence of a "governmental function," 
then proceeded to focus upon whether the activity was or was 
not "discretionary" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(l)(a) (1953, as amended). That statute provides 
that a governmental entity may not be sued for negligence, in 
the exercise of a "governmental function", if the negligence 
"arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not 
the discretion is abused." Id. 
Since the governmental activity in question in this 
case is not a "governmental function," it is not necessary to 
determine whether the activity is or is not "discretionary." 
However, even if the design and installation of traffic warning 
devices at railroad crossings constitutes a "governmental 
function," that activity is not a "discretionary function" as 
that term has been interpreted by this Court. 
In Bigelow & Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court expressly held that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act did not bar a suit filed against the State of Utah 
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by a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident allegedly 
caused by a negligently designed traffic control system. In so 
holding, the Court explained: 
According to the definition of discretion 
established in Frank v. State, Utah 613 P.2d 517 
(1980), a discretionary function under 
§ 63-30-10(1) is ,fconfined to those decisions and 
acts occurring at the 'basic policy making 
level,' and not extended to those acts and 
decisions taking place at the operational level, 
or, in other words, . . . 'those which concern 
routine, everyday matters, not requiring 
evaluation of broad policy factors.'" Although 
the acts of the State involved in designing the 
traffic control system involve some degree of 
discretion, as do almost all acts, the design of 
the traffic control system does not involve the 
tybasic policy making leveltT. 618 P. 2d at 53 
(emphasis added). Accord, Little v. Utah State 
Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983) (defining "discretionary function"). 
In this case, as in Bigelow, governmental immunity 
does not obtain because UD0Tfs regulation and design of the 
crossing where Mr. Gleave had his accident was an operational 
level decision, not a basic policy decision of the State of 
Utah. 
In the lower court proceeding, UDOT relied heavily on 
the case of Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Utah 
2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), for the proposition that Mr. 
Gleave's suit was barred by Section 63-30-10(1)(a). In 
Velasquez, a passenger in a pickup truck which was involved in 
an accident with a train at a railroad crossing, sued the State 
of Utah Public Service Commission. The lower court entered 
summary judgment in favor of Commission and the passenger 
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appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that under the 
applicable statutes, the Public Service Commission had 
discretionary power to require the railroad to construct and 
maintain appropriate safety devices at a grade crossing, and 
the commission was immune from suit by the passenger. 
The Rio Grande submits that Velasquez has been 
overruled sub silentio by Standiford and its progeny and/or 
by Bigelow. To the extent that Velasquez represents a 
position contrary to the position asserted by the Rio Grande in 
this case, the Velasquez opinion should be expressly 
overruled. The Court in Velasquez made the same mistake as 
the lower court in this case. That is, the Velasquez Court 
failed to first determine whether the activity in question was 
or was not a "governmental function." Under the definition of 
"governmental function" articulated in Standiford and its 
progeny, the Velasquez holding must be overruled. The 
Velasquez holding must also be overruled in light of the 
"discretionary function" cases subsequently decided by this 
Court, such as Bigelow and Little. 
7
 Cf., Hobbs v. The D.&R.G.W.R. Co. and the Utah Dept. of 
Transp^, 6 77 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984). Hobbs was decided 
subsequent to the Standiford decision and in Hobbs UDOT was 
named a party upon a claim it had negligently routed traffic 
over a certain railroad crossing during the upgrade 
construction of a different crossing. The case was tried and 
appealed and no issue of sovereign immunity was ever recognized, 
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D. The Rio Grande Was Prejudiced at Trial By 
UDOT'S Absence From the Courtroom 
The Rio Grande is entitled to have a jury evaluate 
simultaneously the comparative negligence, if any, of both the 
Rio Grande and UDOT. By submitting the matter to the jury 
without even having UDOT present in the courtroom, and thereby 
preventing both plaintiff and the Rio Grande from trying the 
issue of UDOT's comparative negligence, if any, the Rio Grande 
was prejudiced. The Rio Grande was particularly prejudiced by 
UDOTfs dismissal in light of the Court's holding in Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984) 
that, in a multi-defendant case, Utah's Comparative Negligence 
Act requires the total negligence of all the defendants to be 
compared to that of the plaintiff to determine whether a 
particular defendant is liable. Prejudice against the Rio 
Grande was further compounded by the lower court's refusal to 
even read to the jury, the Rio Grande's requested Jury 
Instruction No. 29 which would have instructed the jury that 
the Rio Grande could not be held liable for any perceived 
errors or omissions by UDOT (R. /06; 1159; also Addendum 
Exhibit "M"). 
CONCLUSION: RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse 
the judgment entered by the lower court, reinstate the Amended 
Complaint as against co-defendant UDOT, and remand for a new 
trial. During the new trial, the jury should be instructed 
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that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, with the 
jury to determine the degree to which plaintiff's negligence 
and the negligence, if any, of the Rio Grande and UDOT 
proximately caused this accident. 
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-50-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellants and Cross-Respondents The 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company and Utah Railway 
Company were mailed, postage prepaid, this j//__f day of March, 
1985 to: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Paul M. Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Utah Department of Transportation 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto are the following exhibits: 
EXHIBIT "A": Special Verdict Form dated June 18, 
198A (R. 765-68). 
EXHIBIT "B": The Judgment entered on or about August 
15, 1984 (R. 808-09). 
EXHIBIT "C": Rulings dated October 16, 1984 
(regarding denial of the Rio Grande's post-trial motions) (R. 
906). 
EXHIBIT "D": Rulings dated May 29, 1984 (denying the 
Rio Grande's summary judgment motion and partial summary 
judgment motion; also granting dismissal of Utah Department of 
Transportation (R. 569-70). 
EXHIBIT "E": Order Granting Directed Verdict 
Regarding Punitive Damages dated August 15, 1984 (R. 806). 
EXHIBIT "F": Notice of Appeal dated November 9, 1984 
(R. 912-13). 
EXHIBIT "G": Paragraphs 81-86 of the Amended 
Complaint--Tenth Cause of Action Against Utah Department of 
Transportation (R. 343-44). 
EXHIBIT "H": Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1953, as amended). 
EXHIBIT "I": Affidavit of Edna Argyle (R. 779-800). 
EXHIBIT "J": Investigating Officer's Report of the 
Gleave Accident (Defendants' Trial Exhibit 34). 
EXHIBIT "K": "Order Stating Uncontested and 
Contested Facts and Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor 
of Defendant" dated January 10, 1985 in Harsin v. Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., Civil No. C-83-0993W (D. Utah 
1985) ("Winder, J.). 
EXHIBIT "L" The Rio Grande's Requested Jury 
Instruction No. 25 (R. 702) (regarding the seat belt issue) 
(refused by the lower court June 18, 1984). 
EXHIBIT "M": The Rio Grande's Requested Jury 
Instruction No. 29 (R. 706) (regarding UDOT's comparative 
negligence) (refused by the lower court June 18, 1984). 
A-l 
EXHIBIT "N": Letter to Willis Woodard from E. Scott 
Savage at Van Cott, Bagley dated March 3, 1984 (R. 2083-84) and 
part of letter from Willis Woodard to the Rio Grande dated 
February 15, 1984 (R. 2086). 
EXHIBIT "0": Jury Instruction No. 13 (R. 737). 
EXHIBIT "P": Jury Instruction No. 6 (R. 729-30). 
EXHIBIT "Q": Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Co. v. Bellon, Civil No. C83-0888A (D. Utah September 8, 1984) 
(Anderson, J.) ("Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment"). 
EXHIBIT "R": Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Co. v. West Jordan Municipal Corp., Civil No. 82-0344J (D. 
Utah May 28, 1982) (Jenkins, J.) ("Findings of Fact and 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF»UTAH. -
ROBERT L. CLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Civil No. 62912 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, et al, 
Defendants. 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of tne evidence. If you fine that the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer it 
"yes". If, on any issue, you find that the evidence is so 
equally balanced tnat you cannot determine the preponderance 
of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates 
against the issue presented, answer it "no." 
QUESTION ONE: 
plaintiff Robert Gleave negligent? 
A N 3 \\ E R o c • 
(a) Wa: 
(b) If 1(a) is "yes," was such negligence a 
pi'^.a^aie cause of the injuries sustained 
cy plaintiff Robert Gleave? 





(a) Were defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad and Utah Railway Company negligent? 
ANSWER yes, 
(b) If 2(a) is "yes," was such negligence a 
proximate cause of the injuries received by 
plaintiff Robert Gleave? 
ANSWER yycs 
— / . . . 
QUESTION THREE: 
If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 affirmatively 
and have found that plaintiff Robert Gleave and the defendants 
railroads were negligent in a way that caused plaintiff 
Robert GleaveTs injuries, then, and only then, answer the 
following question: 
Considering all of the negligence of defendants 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company and Utah Railway 
Company that you found to be a cause of plaintiff Robert 
Gleave's injuries and all of the negligence of plaintiff 
Robert Gleave that you found to be a cause of plaintiff Robert 
Gleave's own injuries to total 100%, you will now allocate the 
V0, r.egij 'ence Detween tne negligent parties. You will 
weigh the negligence of each party against the negligence 
of the other party and determine the relative negligence 
(3) 
of each party in relation to the negligence of the other party 
or parties. Your answer in percentages will reflect your decision. 
What part of the 100% do you find to be attributable to: 
(a) Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company and Utah Railway Company % 
(b) Plaintiff Robert Gleave % 
Total must be 100% 
QUESTION FOUR: 
Considering only the instructions and evidence concerning 
damages, and without being concerned with the effect of fault 
of any party on damages in answering this question, what 
amount of money would fairly and adequately compensate 
plaintiff Robert Gleave for any and all injuries sustained 
by him as a result of the collision at issue? 
If you have answered Question 3, and if Mr. Gleave is 
entitled to have the amount of damages reduced because of the 
percentage of negligence allocated by you to Mr. Gleave, 
that computation will be made by the Court. Therefore, do 
no make any reduction in your answer to this question. 
A. Fast medical expenses $ ^) (s> p c c ; 
5. Future medical -xpenses$ ^ ^ jj c(O ; 
C. Past lost wages $ Q O, O Q O ; 
D. Loss of future earnings 
and earning capacity $
 (^} *7 5 CJ O o ; 
7V>; 
( J » ) 
General damages to include 
pain and suffering and loss _ 
of enjoyment of life $ £) Q OQO 
^ -2 
Reasonable market value 
of Robert Gleave?s 
automobile on the date of 
the collision $ ) Co OO 
TOTAL $ ^PS~ / <-/Q 
Dated this jj£__ day of June, 1984. 
C&^J2±*, /X, C^, v ^ v \ y 
JURY FOREMAN 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENVER S. RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
GERALD H. BURTON, an ] 
individual, CITY OF 
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal 
corporation, and STATE OF 




i Civil No. 62912 
(Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
This action came on for jury trial on June 11, 
1984 through June 18, 1984, Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, 
District Judge, presiding. The issues having been duly 
tried, and the jury having duly rendered itB verdict. 
It is ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff 
Robert Gleave, recover from the defendants Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Company and Utah Railway Company jointly and 
severally, the sum of $425,140.00, with interest as provided 
by law and the costs of action. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Judgment pursuant to further order of the Court: 
A. Jury Verdict $ 425,140.00 
B. Pre-Judgment interest on 
special damages (§78-27-44 
U . C . A . ) %/*/ I7JSI 
C. Cos t s (Rule 5 4 ( e ) ) 
D. I n t e r e s t a t 12% on $ 4 2 5 , 1 4 0 . 0 0 
Out* /sr /9tjf ^ 
from Jur^ - 10, 190H to date of 
satisfaction of judgment 
(§15-1-4 U.C.A.) 
TOTAL %*/3%937.11 
DATED this JS"' day of &tf-4U>tf , 1 9 8 4 . 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorab 
IN THE DISTJtfCT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY1. STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
Civil No. 62,912 
vs. 
RULINGS 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD CO., et al 
Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8 of the Rules of 
Practice on various motions as hereinafter set forth. The Court has reviewed 
the file, the affidavits and memorandum filed on behalf of the respective 
parties, and upon being fully advised in the premises now makes the following 
RULINGS 
1. The Motion of Defendants D&RGW and Utah Railway for a new trial 
is denied. 
2. The Motion of said defendants to alter or amend the Judgment 1s 
denied. 
3. The Motion of said defendants for a Judgment not withstanding the 
Verdict is denied. 
4. The plaintiff's Motton for award of attorney fees under Sec 78-27-56 
UCA 1s denied. 
Dated this 16th day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
t/////^*/ (cpAv^tfo^^ 
CULLEN Y//HRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: to counsel 
EXHIBIT "CM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 62912 
vs. RULINGS 
D & RGW RAILROAD COMPANY, 
et al, Defendants. 
This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8 
on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the motion 
of aefendant Utah Department of Transportation to 
dismiss, the motion of defendants D&RGW Railroad Company, 
Utah Railway and Burton for summary judgment, 
defendant D&RGW Railroad Company's motion for independent 
physical, plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint, defendant D&RGW Railroad Company's 
motion to strike affidavits, plaintiff's motion to determine 
sufficiency of response to request for admissions, and 
plaintiff's motion to compel discovery. The Court has 
reviewed the file, the affidavits and memoranda of authority 
filed by the various parties, and upon being advised in the 
premises now makes the following 
RULING 
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
2. The motion of defendant Department of Transportation 
EXHIBIT "D" 
(Rulings) (2) 
to dismiss is granted* The Court is of the opinion 
that the decision of whether or not to install a safety signal 
at a particular crossing is a discretionary one protected 
by the Governmental Immunity Act. See also Section 63-30-22 
with respect to punitive damages. 
3. The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company, 
Utah Railway and Burton for summary judgment or partial 
summary judgment is denied. 
4. The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company 
for an independent physical is granted. The Court has been 
informed that the plaintiff has no objection. 
5. Plaintifffs motion for leave to file a second amneded 
complaint is denied. 
6. The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company 
to strike affidavits is denied. 
7. Plaintiff's motion to determine the sufficiency 
of the response to plaintiff's first set of requests for 
admissions is denied. (See Scheduling Order filed December 
^^1 198A.) 
8. Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied. 
(See Scheduling Order filed December 14, 1983 - ) 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Dated thisc/?- day of May 1984. 
cc : to counsel 
u l l e n , - ^ . C h r i s t e n s e n , Judge 
'.*[/ 
mM)5 AM 10: 54 
^'W.HUISH.CURK 
— OtPl'Ty 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
GERALD H. BURTON, an 
individual, CITY OF 
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal 
corporation, and STATE OF 







Civil No. 62912 
(Judge Cullen Y. Christensen) 
At the close of plaintiff's case (June 18, 1984), 
defendant moved for an order granting a directed verdict 
with respect to the issue of punitive damages. 
For reasons set forth in the record, the directed 
verdict is granted with respect to punitive damages only. 
The issue of compensatory damages is specifically 
reserved for the jury. 
UN-
DATED this fS- day of , 1984. 
District Judge 
EXHIBIT "E* 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. RIchman 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorneys for The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, Gerald H. 
Burton, and Utah Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, ) 
] Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
GERALD H. BURTON, an 
individual, CITY OF 
SPRINGVILLE, a municipal 
corporation, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 62912 
Please take notice that defendants The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company and Utah Railway Company hereby 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the 
judgment entered against them in the above entitled matter on 
EXHIBIT "F 
August 15, 1984 and from the District Court's denial of said 
defendants' post-judgment motions. 
DATED this / " day of November, 1984. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL k MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
By y&tJz j . flicks 
Attorneys for Defendants 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, Utah Railway 
Company, and Gerald H. Burton 
P. 0. Box 3400 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
-2-
79. As a direct and proximate result of defendant City 
of Springvillefs aforesaid breach of duty, plaintiff has 
suffered substantial injuries as alleged herein. 
80. On or about the date of September 23, 1982, 
plaintiff served a Notice of Claim upon defendant City of 
Springville as required by §63-30-11 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended); a copy of such Notice of Claim is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Defendant has refused to 
honor plaintiff's claim. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
81. Plaintiff realleges every allegation contained in 
paragrapi :^  1 through 80 above, and incorporates the same 
herein b" reference. 
82. The defendant Department of Transportation, State 
of Utah (hereinafter "State of Utah"), pursuant to §54-4-14, 
et seq., Utah Code Annotate^ (1953, as amended), has the 
duty to provide tor the installation, maintenance, recon-
struction and improvement of safety signals or devices at 
the railroaa crossing that is the subject of this action, at 
1600 Soutr in Springville. 
83. The aetendant State of Utah, knew of or should 
have known of the unreasonably dangerous condition at the 
lbUO South railrocc crossing *nd failed to provide for the 
installation of adequate safety signals or devices, thereby 
breaching its dut> as provided by statute. 
84. The acts of defendant, State of Utah, complained 
of hoToan constitute negliaonce. 
EXHIBIT "G" 
85. As a direct and proximate result of defendant 
State of Utah's aforesaid breach of duty, plaintiff has 
suffered substantial injuries as alleged herein. 
86. On or about the date of September 23, 1982, 
plaintiff served a Notice of Claim upon defendant State of 
Utah, as required by §63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, 
as amended) ; a copy of such Notice of Claim is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". Defendant has failed to honor 
p 1 c I n t I i * f s c 1 a im. 
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
87. At all times alleged herein, defendant City of 
Sprinqville had a stop sign situated 16f West of the 
lC(rj Soutn Railroad Crossing. 
88. From the point of that stop sign, a driver is 
unable tc see any southbound train until that train is 
13"7' from the intersection. 
89. Defendant Denver & Rio Grande has established a 
speed limit of fifty (50) m.p.h. at the 1600 South railroad 
crossing. At the time of the collision alleged herein, the 
Denver & Rio Grande train was traveling at forty nine (49) 
r . p . h . 
90. A tram traveling at 49-50 m.p.h. will cover said 
137' in about 1.87 seconds. (See paragraph 88 above.) 
91. It takes an average driver a minimum of 7.2 
seconds to travel from a full stop at the stop sign across 
the tracks to & point of safety. 
92. According to the foregoing speeds and distances, 
it j L; n.athrat i r al ] * T.^ossibie for any driver to safely 
1(» 
OJ-JV-1 
Chapter 30. Governmental Immunity 
Act 
43-34-1. Short tttk. 
43-34-1. DcfaaMoaa. 
4 3 4 1 ^ Iauao**y of 
43-34-4. Act ac oraaoi 
aeatt«4*a*fltt*-t l l%c\*t 
for lajary fn 
43<3i-3t. laoVaaatflcatloa of 
634*4. Wahor of 
43-34*4. Wartor of 
for lajary e*""*** * f 
coaattttoa of Ugawayt, 
for lajary fro" < 
;, strectare, or other aabac 
for lajary coosaa* ay 
of esaatoyot - Excoatloas • 
ay vtolaCloB of foartk 
Notice - Coaieats - Service -
•tote or Hi caaatoyot - flaw for 
43-34-U 
iaiplnyw « Tlsae for fllaag aotice. 
43-34-14. da te for lajary - Appro 
IwtmmtmtMi eatlty or tasaraace 
•oMrfWooorHs 
carrier witala atacty 
43-34-15. Deals* of data for lajary - Aataortty aad Use 
for fttag actioa afalaft govenuaeatal eatlty. 
43-34-14. Jartoatenoa of afetrkt coaru orer actios* -
Appacatioa of Raks of ChU Procadarc. 
43*34-17. Veaae of actioas. 
43-34-1S. Coatproaaise aad settleaaeat of actioas. 
43-30-1*. Uodertattag repaired of oUJatiff la actioa. 
43-34-24. Jodgaaeot agatost go*/eraateataf eatlty ban 
aetiea agaftast camaloyae. 
43-30-21. Erprakd 
43-34-22. Eicmplary or aaafttvt 4asaagcs prohibited -
Goteraofceatai eatlty exempt froai exeeatfoa, attacbajeat 
43-30-23. Fayaarat of etatai or Jedgaaeat agaiast state -
Preteatattat for payajeat. 
43-30-24. Payaaest of dalai or Jedgiaeot agaJast political 
sabdhisioa - Ptocoaare by torcraiag body. 
43-34-25. Payawat of data or Jedgaaeat afalast political 
fabdMdoe • lostafljaeat aayaaeat*. 
43-34-24. Resent foods for eayaatat of dates or 
parceaat of lasaraace created by political sabdhrWoas. 
43-30-27. Tax levy by pobticaJ sebdMsloef for payawat 
of dsiats, Jedgioeats or laoaraact aresaiase*. 
43-34-21. Uabfllty (asaraacc - Parcaase or sdMataraace 
ay goteraiaeetal eatlty aotaorised - EmhHiaaafot of 
trast accoaats for self4aaaraace. 
43-34-2f. feaeaJed. 
43-3o-2f J . liability fauoraec* - CoostractloB of poacy 
aot hi comptmac* wit* act. 
43-34-30. Repealed. 
43-30-31. Liability iesaraect • Coestroctloa of policy oot 
la comottaac* wUk ad. 
43-30-32. liability tasvaoce - Metaods for parcaase or 
43-30-33. UabOfry ftesaraace - Utaaraace for eiaployees 
eetaertzed • No rtgat to ladeaialflcatloa or coatrlbatloa 
froai goTerasacatal ageacy. 
43-30-34. LiaritatJoa of Jadgoaeats agaiast govenuaeatal 
eatity or employee - latarmoct coverage exceptioa 
43-30-35 Compreaeaslrt Mab4aty plaa • Provldlag 
coverage • Expeates of attoraey geaeral la repreeeatiag 
stale or esaployoes. 
43-30-34. Defeodtag gOTcnuaeat eatployee - Rosjaest • 
CooperaHoa - Paysaeat of Jedgaaeat. 
43-30-37 Recovery of Jadgaaeat paid aad defease coats by 
goveraaaeat eatployee. 
43-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be died 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 
a3-30-2. Deflaltioaa, 
k»vtt&\b^4ba9*«'. 
(1) "State" means the state of Utah, and i 
any office, department, agency, auth 
commission, board, institution, hospital, 
university or other instrumentality of the state; 
(2) 'Political subdivision* means any 
city, town, school district, public transit 
redevelopment agency, special imp 
taxing district, or other governmental sub 
or public corporation; 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state] 
its political subdivisions as defined herein; 
(4) "Employee" means any officer, emp 
servant of a governmental entity, whether 
compensated, including student teacf 
certificated in accordance with section 53-2 
educational aides, students engaged in prov 
services to members of the pubbc in the 
an approved medical, nursing, or 
professional health care clinical training pro 
volunteers and tutors; 
(5) "Claim" means any claim or cause of i 
for money or damages against a gove 
entity or against an employee; 
(6) "Injury" means death, injury to a 
damage to or loss of property, or any other : 
thai a 9exsaa> may, suffer to ok Qexs/ttu o* 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a 
person or his agent. 
(7) "Personal injury" means an injury of i 
kind other than property damage; 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or 
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in 
personal property. 
63-30-3. Insani ty of governmental entities frosa" 
salt. 
Except as may be otherwise provided 
chapter, all governmental entities are is 
from suit for any injury which results fronT 
exercise of a governmental functic 
governxnentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
other governmental health care facility, and ffl 
an approved medical, nursing, or 
professional health care clinical training pro 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and 
construction, repair, and operation of flood 
storm systems by governmental entities 
considered to be governmental functions, 
governmental entities and their officers 
employees are immune from suit for any injury < 
damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not coastraed as adniissfosv 
or denial of liability - Effect of waiver of 
unmaalry - Exclusive remedy • Joinder of 
employee • Limitations oa personal Uabfllty. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, 
specifically provided, shall be construed as M 
admission or denial of liability or responsibility • 
so far as governmental entities or their employes 
are concerned. If immunity from suit is waived tyj 
this chapter, consent to be sued is granted 
liability of the enuty shall be determined as if 4jj 
entity were a private person. 
EXHIBIT "H" 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as 
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which 
a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for an injury caused by an act or* 
omission which occurs during the performance of 
such employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority it, after 
the effective date of this act, exclusive -of any 
other civil action or proceeding by reason of the 
same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave 
rise to the claim, unless the employee acted or 
failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representative 
capacity if the act or omission complained of is 
one for which the governmental entity may be 
liable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or 
failed to act due to fraud or malice. n o 
63-30-5. Waiver of humanity as to contractual 
obligations. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived as to any contractual obligation and 
actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations shall not be subject to the requiremenu 
of sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 63-
30-19. tsas 
63-30-6. Waiver of humanity as to actions 
involving property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for the recovery of any property real or 
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet 
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other 
hens thereon or to determine any adverse claim 
thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any 
mortgage or other lien said entity may have or 
claim on the property involved. ltss 
63-30-7. Waiver of humanity for Injury from 
negligent operation of motor vehicles • Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury resulting from the negligent 
operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or 
other equipment during the performance of his 
duties, within the scope of employment, or tinder 
color, of authority; provided, however, that this 
section shall not apply to the operation of 
emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements 
of section 41-6-14. 1*3 
63-30-ft. Waiver of Imnmaity for injury canted by 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
highways, bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury caused by a defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, 
bndge, viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
IMS 
63-30-9. Waiver of Immunity for Injury from 
diagerons or defective public building, structure, 
or other nubile Improvement - Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous 
or defective condition of any public building. 
63-30-11 
structure, dam, reservoir or other .public 
improvement. Immunity is not waived for patent 
effective conditions. uei 
6M0-10. Waiver of immunity for mjury earned 
by negligent act or amlasinn of t maloyn « 
Exceptions- Wavier for injury canted by vUmdoa 
•f fourth amendment rights. 
(l)lmmunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of bis employment 
except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused, 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, ma&dous proaecntion, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, 
infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights, or 
(c) arises out of the Issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any 
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or 
similar authorization, or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection of any property, or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution 
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even 
if malicious or without probable cause, or 
(0 irises out of a misrepresentation by said 
employee whether or not such is negligent or 
intentional, or 
(g) arises out of or results, from riot, unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence 
and civil disturbances, or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the 
collection of and assessment of taxes, or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the. Utah 
National Guard, or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail or 
other place of legal confinement, or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state 
lands or the result of any activity authorized by 
the state land board. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately caused or 
arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16 of 
Title 78 which shall be the exclusive remedy for 
injuries to those protected rights. If section 78-16-
5 or subsection 77-35- 12(g) or any parts thereof 
are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
subsection (2) shall be void and governmental 
entities shall remain immune from suit for 
violations of fourth amendment rights. urn 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents -
Service - Legal disability. 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute 
of limiutions that would apply if the claim were 
against a private person commences to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against 
a governmental entity or against an employee for 
an act of omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall, 
before maintaining an action, file a written notice 
of claim with such entity. 
63-30-12 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief 
statement of facts, the nature of the claim 
asserted, and the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known, shall be signed 
by the person making the claim or such person's 
agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall 
be directed and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity in the manner and within the 
time prescribed in section. 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, 
as applicable. 
(4) If, at the time the claim arises, the claimant is 
under the age of majority, or mentally 
incompetent and without a legal guardian, or 
imprisoned, upon application by the claimant and 
after hearing and notice to the governmental entity 
the court, in its discretion, may extend the time 
for service of notice of claim; but in no event shall 
it grant an extension which exceeds the applicable 
statute of limitations. In determining whether to 
grant an extension, the court shall consider 
whether the delay in serving the notice of claim 
will substantially prejudice the governmental entity 
in maintaining its defense on the merits. was 
63-30-12. Claim against state or Its employee -
Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state or its employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under subsection 63-30-1K4). i§t3 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or Its 
employee - Time for Wing notke. 
A claim against a political subdivision or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment,' or under color of authority, 
is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within 
one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under 
subsection 63-30-11(4). IMJ 
63-30-14. Claim for iajary - Approval or denial by 
governmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall 
act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of 
its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to 
have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. ms 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority 
and time for filing action against governmental 
entity. 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute 
an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity in those circumstances in 
which immunity from suit has been waived in this 
chapter. The action must be commenced within 
one year after denial or the denial period as 
specified in this chapter. \w 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over 
actions - Application of Roles of Qvfi Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over any action brought under this 
chapter and such actions shall be governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are 
consistent with this chapter. . m i 
63-30-17. Venue of action*. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the 
county in which the claim arose ortin Salt Lake 
County. Actions against a county may be brought 
in the county in which the claim arose, or in the 
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in 
any county contiguous to the defendant county. 
Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions against all 
other political subdivisions including cities and 
towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in 
which the claim arose. n o 
63-30-11. Compromise and settJeaatnt of actions. 
A political subdivision, after conferring with its 
legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such, 
officer, may compromise and settle any action as 
to the damages or other relief sought. % 
The risk manager in the department of 
administrative services may compromise and settle 
any claim for damages filed against the state up to 
and including $10,000 for which the risk 
management fund may be liable, and may, with 
the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the 
department of administrative services, compromise 
and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 
for which the risk management fund may be 
liable. m l 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff fas 
action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall 
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, 
but in no case less than the sum of $300, 
conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of 
taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the 
action or fails to recover judgment. utf 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity 
bars action against employee. 
Judgment against a governmental entity in a i 
action brought under this act shall constitute i 
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by 
reason of the same subject matter, against the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim. tttl 
63-30-21. Repealed. l m 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages 
prohibited - Governmental entity exempt from 
execution, attachment or garnishment. 
No judgment shall be rendered against' the 
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages; nor shall execution, attachment or 
garnishment issue against the governmental entity. 
ms 
63-30-23. Payment of daim or Judgment against 
state - Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by 
subsection 63-30-2(5) or any final judgment 
obtained against the state shall be presented to the 
state risk manager, or to the office, agency, 
institution or other instrumentality involved for 
payment, if payment by said instrumentality is 
otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not 
authorized by law then said judgment or claim 
shall be presented to the board of examiners and 
the board shall proceed as provided in section 63-
6-10. i s * 
43-30-24. Paysaeat of daim or judgment against 
political sabdlvtoloa • Procedure by govseaiag 
body. 
Any daim approved by a political subdivision or 
any final judgment obtained against a political 
subdivision shall be submitted to the governing 
body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general 
funds of said political subdivision unless said 
funds are appropriated to some other use or 
restricted by law or contract for other purposes, ms 
63-30-25. Payment of daim or jadgmeat agaiast 
political subdrrisioe • laftaDmeat payments. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or 
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the 
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing 
annual installments of equal size or In such other 
installments as are agreeable to the claimant. tm 
63-30-26. Reserve faads for paymeat of claims or 
purchase of iasarmact created by aoHtkal 
sabdhrlsioas. 
Any political subdivision may create and 
maintain a reserve fund or may jointly with one or 
more other political subdivisions make 
contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the 
purpose of making payment of claims against the 
co-operating subdivisions when they become 
payable pursuant to this chapter, or for the 
purpose of purchasing liability insurance to 
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or 
all risks created by this chapter. ms 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political sabdhrlsioas for 
paymeat of daim*, Jadgmeats or lasaraace 
premiums. 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the 
contrary, all political subdivisions shall have 
authority to levy an annual property tax sufficient 
to pay any claims, settlements or judgements, or 
to pay the costs to defend against same, or for the 
purpose of establishing and maintaining a reserve 
fund for the payment of such claims, settlements 
or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated; 
and there is hereby specifically included any 
judgment against an elected official or employee 
of any political subdivision, including peace 
officers based upon a claim for punitive damages, 
provided, that the authority of a political 
subdivision for the payment of such judgments for 
punitive damages is bmited in any individual case 
to $10,000. It is hereby declared to be the 
legislative intent that the payments authorized for 
punitive judgments is money spent for a public 
purpose within the meaning of this section and 
Article XIII, section 5 of the Constitution of 
Utah; or to pay the premium for such insurance as 
authorized, even though as a result of such levy 
the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is 
exceeded; provided, that in no event shall such 
levy exceed one-half mill nor shall the revenues 
derived therefrom be used for any other purpose 
than those stipulated herein. lfTS 
63-30-24. Liability iasurmoce - Purchase or sdf-
ittsuraace by govennneutal entity authorized -
Establishment of trust accounts for setf-iasuraace. 
Any governmental entity within the state may 
purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or 
self-insure and purchase excess commercial 
insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this 
chapter against any risk created or recognized by 
this chapter or any action for which a 
governmental entity or its employee may be held 
63-30-32 
Sable. 
In addition to any other reasonable means of 
self-insurance, a governmental entity may sdf-
insurt with respect to specified classes of claims by 
establishing a trust account under the management 
of an independent private trustee having authority 
with respect to claims of that character to expend 
both principal and earnings of the trust account 
solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery, 
and other pretrial and litigation expenses including 
attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which the 
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for 
which a compromise settlement may be agreed 
anon. The monies and Interest earned on said trust 
fund shall be subject to Investment pursuant to the 
State Money 'Management Act 51-7-1 to 51-7-2 
and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor. 
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust 
agreement between the governmental entity and 
the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ 
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its 
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets 
of the trust, to provide for claims investigation 
and adjustment services, to employ expert 
witnesses and consultants, and to provide such 
other services and functions necessary and proper 
to cany out the purposes of the trust. ism 
63-30-29. Repealed. tm 
63-30-29.5. Uabmty lasaraace - Goverasaeat 
vehicles operated by employees oatsMe scope of 
emptoymeat. 
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven 
by employees of the governmental entity with the 
express or implied consent of the entity, but 
which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of 
an automobile accident, is not being driven and 
used within the course and scope of the driver's 
employment is deemed to provide the driver with 
the insurance coverage required by Chapter 41, 
Title 31, and is deemed to provide liability 
coverage by the governmental entity in accordance 
with the requirements of the Safety Responsibility 
Act (section 41-12-1 et. seq.). In no event, 
however, shall the limits of, the liability coverage 
provided Under this subsection be deemed to 
exceed the minimum bodily injury and property 
limits specified in section 41-12-5. was 
63-30-30. Repealed. tro 
63-30-31. liability lasaraace - CoastructJoa of 
policy not la compttaace with act. 
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement 
hereafter issued and purchased to insure against 
any risk which may arise as a result of the 
application of this chapter, which contains any 
condition or provision not in compliance with the 
requirements of the chapter, shall not be rendered 
invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied 
in accordance with such conditions and provisions 
as would have applied had such policy, rider or 
endorsement been in full compliance with this 
chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid. ism 
63-30-32. liability lasaraace • Methods for 
purchase or reaewal. 
No contract or policy of insurance may be 
purchased or renewed under this chapter except 
upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best 
bidders; except that the purchase or renewal of 
insurance by the state shall be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of sections 63-56-1 
through 63-56-73. isaj 
63-30-33 
63-30-33. UaMftty intmact - latmuK* for 
eaiployeea aathortzed • No right to 
Isuif •IfVirtoa or cosrtribtrtion from 
govtrnsaeatal agency. 
A governmental entity may insure any or all of 
its employees against liability, in whole or in part, 
for injury or damages resulting from an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of an 
employee's dut ies , within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, 
regardless of whether or not said entity is immune 
from suit for said act' or omission, and any 
expenditure for such insurance is for a public 
purpose. The insurer under any contract or policy 
of insurance pursuant to this section shall have no 
right to indemnification or contribution from the 
governmental entity or hi employee with respect to 
any loss or liability covered by the contract or' 
policy. ms 
43-90-34. Us&katkMi of Jadgsaenls agalast 
governsaesrtal entity or eaaployee - lasarance 
coverage exception. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if 
a judgment for personal injury against a 
governmental entity, or an employee whom a 
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, 
exceeds $250,000 for one person in any one 
occurrence, or 1500,000 for two or more persons 
in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the 
judgment to that amount. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if 
a judgment for property damage against a 
governmental entity, or an employee whom a 
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, 
exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount. 
(3) If a governmental entity has secured 
insurance coverage in excess of the amounts set 
forth in subsections (1) and (2), the court shall 
reduce the amount of the judgment or award to a 
sum equal to the applicable limits of the insurance 
coverage. ist3 
43-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan - Providing 
coverage - Expenses of attorney general in 
representing state or employees. 
(1) After consultation with appropriate state 
agencies, the risk manager in the department of 
administrat ive services shall provide a 
comprehensive liability plan, with limits not lower 
than those set forth in section 63-30-34, which 
will protect the state and its indemnified 
employees from claims and liability. Deductibles 
and maximum limits of coverage shall be 
determined by the risk manager in consultation 
with the director of administrative services. 
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the 
risk management fund established in section 63-1-
47, to procure and provide coverage to all state 
agencies and their indemnified employees, except 
those specifically exempted by law, and shall 
apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance 
with section 63-1-47. Unless specifically 
authorized by statute to do so, including 
subsection 63-1-47(9), no agency other than the 
risk manager may procure or provide liability 
insurance for the state. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 67-
5-3 or any other provision of this code, the state 
attorney general may bill the department of 
administrative services for all costs and legal fees 
expended by the attorney general, including 
attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing* 
the state or any indemnified employee against any' 
claim for which the risk management fund may be^  
liable and in advising state agencies and employees^ 
regarding such claims. The risk manager shall \ 
draw funds from the risk management fund for* 
this purpose. WJ 
63-30-36. Defending government esnntoyee • 
Reqnest - Cooperation * Payment of jadgsneai. 
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend itaj 
employee against a claim, the employee must make, 
a written request to the governmental entity toJ 
defend him and must make it within ten days after" 
service of process upon him or within such longer: 
period as would not prejudice the governmental* 
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, orj 
conflict with notice requirements imposed on the] 
entity in connection with insurance carried by the' 
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee] 
fails to make a request or fails to reasonably^ 
cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity? 
is not required to defend or continue to defend ther 
employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or, 
settlement against the employee in respect to the 
claim. « 
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense; 
of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay^  
any judgment based upon or any compromise or, 
settlement of the claim except as provided in! 
subsection (3). »~J 
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the) 
defense of an employee under an agreement withi 
the employee that the government entity reserves 
the right not to pay the judgment, compromise, ofj 
settlement unless it is established that the daiml 
arose out of an act or omission occurring during: 
the performance of his duties, within the scope o f 
his employment, or under color of authority. tm] 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense J 
costs by government employee. I 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays1 
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of 
it, which the governmental entity is required to< 
pay under section 63-30-36, the employee it 
entitled to recover the amount of such payment 
and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense 
from the governmental entity. ^ 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the: 
defense of an employee against 8 claim, or does 
conduct the defense under an agreement a£ 
provided in subsection 63-30-36(3), the employee 
may recover from the governmental entity under 
subsection (1) if: ^ 
(a) The employee establishes that ihe act or 
omission upon which the judgment is based 
occurred during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of his employment, or under 
color of authority, and that he conducted the 
defense in good faith; and 
(b) The governmental entity does not establish 
that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud 
or malice of the employee. tfts 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity 
by employee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or pan of a 
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement 
of a claim against the governmental entity or an 
employee, the employee may not be required to 
indemnify the governmental entity for the 
payment. isaj 
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Q ^ D E K T V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
GERALD H. BURTON, an 
individual, CITY OF 
SPRINGVILLE, a municipal 
corporation, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
I, Edna Argyle, being first duly sworn, do say: 
1. I was a member of the jury in the above-entitled case. 
2. To the best of my recollection, during the questioning 
of prospective jurors, when counsel mentioned the 
witnesses to be called. Dr. John Mendenhall was not 
named as a prospective witness. 
AFFIDAVIT OF EDNA ARGYLE 
Civil No. 62912 
EXHIBIT "I" 
*;yj 
3. I have had medical services provided to me by Dr. 
Mendenhall, including the implantation of artificial 
knees. 
4. The first time that I knew that Dr. Mendenhall was to 
be a witness for Plaintiff was when Dr. Mendenhall was 
called to the stand. 
5. I recognized the Doctor, but I did not inform the 
Court or the attorneys that I knew the Doctor and had 
been treated by him. 
6. I did inform members of the jury of my medical 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this o?I^  ^  day of ^  h/jjj , 
1984. ,y 
Notary Publi< .._ja ic 
Residing at : Q ^ z / t^y^i ^ 7 t t ^A^x< 
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SPRINGVILLE CITY P0LI2E DEPARTMENT 
NARRATIVE REPORT PAGE* L 
— - 82-379 DATE AND TIME THIS REPORT 
16APR82 0630hrs. 
TYPE OF REPORT 
T/C 
16APR82 0630hrs. I was dipatched to a "possible train vehicle" collision, location 
unk. at the "south end of town" and "around 700 South." I checked the area of 
700 South and 800 South Main St. and was then directed to the railroad yard on 
400 Vest. As I checked that location, the actual location was relayed to me as 
1600 South Main St.. Upon arrival I confirmed need for an ambulance with dispatch 
and attended to the driver (injured party). Driver was conscious and seemed 
rational inspite of his injuries. I obtained information as to identity of driver 
and then asked him what had happened. Driver, Robert Gleave, gave me the following 
information: Driver was E/B on 1600 South. He stated that he "slowed down" at 
the stop sign and looked to the south. He did not see any train. He then turned 
to look north. When he did he saw the train "right on top of" him. He said 
that he tried evasive action (stopping and backing) but was unable to avoid 
collision. Driver did not know how he was ejected from the vehicle. Ambulance 
personnel then arrived and attended to Driver. 
I then contacted the conductor, C.E. Connors, who gave the following information 
to me: The train (owned and operated by Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad) 
was on an eastbound route (south bound at the point of impact) at approx. 50 
(fifty) miles per hour. As they approached the intersection of 1600 South, they 
observed the vehicle (V-l) pull out too far into the intersection before stopping, 
and into the path of their train. The train was a 33 (thirty three) car diesel 
which was running emptv at the time. 
The following measurements were taken at the scene: Width of total roadway 
at intersection with RR tracks—21'5" . Distance from south edge of roadway to 
approx. P0I--7?c)n. Distance ^01 to POR--29'0". Distance veh to tracks approx.3!. 
Driver was located between the veh. and the tracks. 
SPRINCyiLLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
NARRATIVE REPORT PAGEj*. 
DATE AND TIME THIS REPORT 
16APR82 0630hrs. 
TYPE OF REPORT 
T/C 
82-379 
Driver was transported by ambulance to Mountain View Hospital, with multiple 
injuries to torso, head, leg (area of left knee) and left foot. 
Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza appeared to be totaled, all windshields and side 
windows appeared in tact with the exception of the drivers side window which was 
down (probable point of ejection.) 
Unknown at time of report whether the train engineer had activated his 
horn as audible signal as he was approaching the intersection. 
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THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER STATING UNCONTESTED AND 
CONTESTED FACTS AND GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
Civil No. C-83-0993W 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an action by plaintiff against defendant for 
injuries sustained by plaintiff when he collided with 
defenant's stationary train at a railroad crossing at Ogden, 
Utah. Defendant The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary 
Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
David K. Winder, Monday, January 7, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff Charles A. Harsin was represented by Richard W. 
Campbell. Defendant was represented by Alan L. Sullivan and 
Patrick J. O'Hara. Since the Court is not going to grant 
judgment on the whole case, this Order is entered pursuant to 




Having reviewed the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, together with the uncontested facts stated in 
the Pretrial Order and Affidavits and Memorandum filed by 
defendant in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Partial Summary Judgment, the Court finds that there is no 
genuine issue as to the following material facts: 
1. At or about 3:55 a.m. on June 28, 1979, plaintiff 
Charles Harsin was driving east along 21st Street at Ogden, 
Utah on a 1973 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, Sprint Model. 
2. At the time of the accident, it was dark, the 
weather was clear, and the -jrface of the road was level. 
3. The Rio Grande's track crosses 21st Street at a 
point approximately one block west of Wall Street at Ogden. 
4. On the morning of the accident a standard black 
and white railroad "crossbuck" sign was located about 36 feet 
west of the west rail of the track; a white line was painted 
across all three lanes of 21st Street at a distance of about 36 
feet west of the west rail; one standard round yellow and black 
railroad crossing advance warning sign was located about 200 
feet west of the crossing and another standard round yellow and 
black railroad crossing advance warning sign was located about 
611 feet west of the crossing. Three large white "railroad 
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crossing" pavement markings were located about 181 feet west of 
the crossing and two more large white "railroad crossing" 
pavement markings were located about 611 feet west of the 
crossing. 
5. Plaintiff definitely knew that he was approaching 
the railroad crossing on the morning of the accident because he 
had gone across the crossing at least once a day for 
approximately three years before June 1979. 
6. Plaintiff collided with the side of the Rio 
Grande's stationary engine at the 21st Street crossing. 
7. Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the Rio 
Grande on or about June 24, 1983. 
III. 
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT 
The following material facts are in good faith 
controverted by the parties and shall be reserved for trial: 
1. At the time of the accident, what Rio Grande 
lights were operating? 
2. At the time of the accident, was the train bell 
ringing? 
3. At the time of the accident, was plaintiff 
travelling too fast under the circumstances to stop in time to 
prevent the collision? 
-3-
IV. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Having fully considered the foregoing uncontested 
facts and the applicable law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff that, to the extent that 
plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant was negligent in 
not installing additional or different signs, lights, or other 
traffic control devices at the 21st Street railroad crossing, 
said allegations are dismissed with prejudice as a matter of 
law because the authority for installing signs, lights, or 
other traffic control devices at railroad crossings within Utah 
is exclusively vested in agencies of the State of Utah. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-15, 54-4-15.1, 54-4-15.3 (1953, as amended). 
As a matter of law, therefore, defendant had no duty to install 
additional or different traffic warning devices at the 21st 
Street railroad crossing. 
2. Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff that the 21st Street railroad 
crossing is not an extrahazardous crossing. 
3. Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff with respect to any allegations 
in plaintiff's Complaint that defendant is liable to plaintiff 
for negligently causing damage to plaintiff's personal 
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property. As a matter of law, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2) 
(1953, as amended) requires that an action for negligent damage 
to personal property be brought within three years after the 
cause of action arises. Since plaintiff's Complaint was filed 
more than three years after the accident described in 
plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff is barred from making any 
claim at trial for damage to his personal property. 
The Court is of the opinion that it is not appropriate 
to enter complete summary judgment on the whole case because 
there are contested issues of fact regarding the extent of 
plaintiff's negligence and as to what Rio Grande lights were 
burning and whether the train bell was ringing. 
ENTERED this ' ,, " day of January, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
David K. Winder 
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INSTRUCTION NO, z< 
The evidence in this case has shown that Mr. Gleave was 
not wearing his seat belt at the time of the collision, 
although his vehicle was equipped with seat belts. If you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Gleave*s damages 
would have been less severe if he had been wearing a seat belt 
at the time of the accident, then you are instructed to reduce 
the amount of damages, if any, that you award to Mr. Gleave in 
an amount equal to the extent that Mr. Gleave!s damages would 
have been avoided had Mr. Gleave worn his seat belt. 
EXHIBIT "L" 
7M:> 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2*7 
One of the interrogatories that the jury will have to 
answer in the Special Verdict is whether the Utah Department of 
Transportation was negligent, and if so, whether that 
negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Gleave's injuries. 
If the jury does attribute negligence to the Department of 
Transportation, a related interrogatory that the jury will have 
to answer is to what extent (expressed as a percentage) did the 
Department of Transportation's negligence contribute to Mr. 
Gleave's injuries. It is necessary for the jury to answer the 
interrogatories about the percentage of negligence, if any, 
attributable to the Utah Department of Transportation because 
the jury may not hold the Rio Grande, Utah Railway or the City 
of Springville responsible for the Department of 
Transporation's errors and omissions, if any, regarding the 
geometic design of the 1600 South crossing and/or the adequacy 
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March 3f 1984 
Mr. Willis J. Woodard, #16623 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Re: Your deposition in Gleave v. The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, et al. Civil No. 
62912. 
Dear Willis: 
With regard to the above-referenced matter, I have 
received from Cameron Hansen two similar but different 
handwritten notes which contain proposed ffchangesff to your 
sworn deposition testimony. 
Your notes are troublesome because they appear to 
suggest that your testimony may depend upon whether the 
Railroad will rehire you after you are released from prison. 
Neither you nor the Railroad can permit such an inference. 
Your testimony must be the truth -- nothing more, nothing less. 
The possibility of your return to the Railroad will in 
no way be affected by your testimony in this case -- so long as 
you tell the truth. The Railroad cannot promise you employment 
if you testify in a manner favorable to the Railroad and it 
will not refuse you employment just because your testimony 
might be unfavorable. 
At your deposition you were sworn to tell the truth 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Because of this, 
the testimony you gave at that time was given under penalty of 
EHXIBIT "N" 
nr\rm 
; BAG LEY, C O R N W A L L 6. MCCARTHY 
H r. Willis J, Woodard 
March 3f 1984 
Page 2 
perjury. The ffchangesH which you indicate that you will send 
to opposing counsel only if you do not hear from Mr. Hansen, 
both differ Jtrom what you testified to earlier, and, in some 
instances, do not even relate to the same material addressed by 
the question and your original answer. Moreover, the "changes" 
you suggest in your second note differ from the same "changes" 
in your first note. I simply cannot accept these as legitimate 
changes to your deposition when they are transmitted under 
conditions that suggest they are only to be made if the 
Railroad doesn't guarantee you employment when you get out of 
prison. 
If your original testimony was true and complete as 
given, you change it only by committing perjury. On the other 
hand, if your original testimony was not true or complete, you 
must change it to make it so, regardless of the consequences. 
Please let either me or Cameron Hansen know what you 
desire to do with respect to this testimony. It is my 
understanding that you already have a copy of your deposition. 
If not, let me know and I can get you another copy. Also, I am 
providing proper forms for changing your deposition, should you 
decide to make any changes. 
Very truly yours, 
" ^ ^ ^ 7-^ 
E. Scott Savage/^ 
ESS/mje 
Enclosures 
P.O.BOX 250 # / 6 < ^ * 
DRAPER, UT A] > 8'.020 
DATE: / ^ < 6 /%_HZA_ 
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/7? 7)i=>nr..^ff}fi77 ?f £3?/£ jfffr cprc-f<.</ 
/ f 1 
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Instruction No. ' ^ 
Under Utah law the ultimate determination regarding 
right of way and crossing design and crossing warning and 
safety devices is placed under the control of the Utah 
Department of Transportation. You may not therefore find 
either defendant railroad negligent based upon any defects 
which might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 
South crossing or based upon any problems you may perceive 
in the lack of traffic warning devices at the 1600 South 
crossing. 
However, irrespective of the foregoing, the defendant 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad is not relieved of 
any responsibility to exercise due care when its trains 
approach such crossing. Consequently, if you find that the 
configuration of the land and other physical features in 
the area make sucn crossing more than ordinarily hazardous 
and that the warning devices employed at the crossing were 
inadequate to warn the public of the danger, you shall 
determine wnether the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad knew of or ^hould have known of such condition 
and whether it exercised due care in view of all the 
circumstances. The failure to exercise due care under 
such conditions would constitute negligence. 
EXHIBIT "0" 
Instruction (Jo. '/ 
The claims of the parties are as follows: 
FLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
(a) That the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad failed to give a sufficient and reasonable 
audible warning that the train was approaching the 1600 
South Crossing. 
(b) That the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad failed to use reasonable caution in approaching 
the 1600 South crossing taking into consideration 
the physical features affecting visability at such 
crossing. 
(c) That defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad and defendant Utah Railway failed to remove 
plants and shrubs from the railroad right-of-way 
which obstructed the plaintiff's view of any train 
approaching the 1600 South crossing. 
DEFENDANTS DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD AND UTAH RAILWAY CLAIM 
The defendants Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
and Utah Railway deny the claims of plaintiff and allege that 
plaintiff was himself negligent in failing to maintain 
a proper lookout and in failing to yield the right-of-way 
to the tra i n . 
EXHIBIT "P" 
Instruction No. ^' (cont'd) 
The foregoing is merely a general statement of what 
the indicated parties claim against each other and is 
not intended to indicate what facts may or may not have 
been established by the evidence. 
7;>n 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Jeffrey E. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
) 
S.T*:* 
» i 0 81. WW 
PAUL L. bADCER 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
LeANN D. BELLON, LAIRD BELLON, : 
ANGELEE BELLONf by her Guardian : 
Ad Litem Laird Bellon, and JESS : 
LAIRD BELLON, Deceased, by the : 
Personal Representative of his : 
estate. Laird Bellon, : 
- vs -
Plaintiffs, : 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE : 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, : 
Defendant. : 
ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-0888A 
The defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came 
on for hearing before the Court at 9:30 A.M. on August 30, 1984. 
The defendant was represented by E. Scott Savage and Jeffrey E. 
Nelson, and the plaintiffs were represented by Ray M. Harding and 
Greg W. Stephens. The Court considered the memoranda and evidence 
proffered by the parties and heard oral argument. 
The Court, being fully advised, finds that the Utah State 
Legislature has vested state agencies with the exclusive authority 
EXHIBIT "Q" 
to determine and prescribe the type of warning signs, lights, and 
other traffic control devices for public railroad crossings within 
the State of Utah. For this reason, the Court is of the opinion 
that the Railroad cannot be found negligent for failing to install 
control devices different from those which existed at the subject 
crossing on the day of the accident. The Court, however, cannot 
determine at this time that the plaintiff, LeAnn D. Bellon, was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is granted with respect to the plain-
tiffs' claim of negligence in regard to the implementation of 
crossing protection; and the defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the issue of plaintiff LeAnn D. Bellon1s contributory 
negligence is denied at this time. 
DATED this j) day of ^4^$Y. 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
ALDOTJ Ajr ANDERSOt^  
Federa l Disrt^cict Court Judge 
APPROVED_AS TO FORM: 
HARMING & HANDING 
Copies mailed 9/10/84:dp 
Ray M. Harding, Esq. 
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, VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
I E. Scott Savage 
II
 Paul M. Durham 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8A1A4 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 




WEST JORDAN IftJNICIPAL 
CORPORATION', et al. , 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, The Denver L Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Cor.panv, is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Delaware and having its principal place of business in 
the State of Colorado. 
2. Defendant, V.esz Jordan Municipal Corporation, is a 
municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of 
Utah with its principal place of business in the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant, Dennis K. Randall, is a citizen of the 
State of Utah and mayor of the City of West Jordan. 
U. Defendant, Allan G Tolman, is a citizen of the 
State of Utah, and manager of the City of West Jordan. 
5. Defendants, Si.err Monson, Chris But tars, Betty Naylor, 
and Howard Larben, are citizens of the State of Utah and members 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-82-03^4J 
EXHIBIT "R" 
of the West Jordan City Council. 
6. The matter in controversy herein exceeds, exclusive 
of interest and costs, the sum of $10,000. 
7. Plaintiff is engaged in business as a common carrier 
by rail in interstate commerce. 
8. During the month of February or March, 1982, 
defendants caused to be enacted an ordinance designated as 
sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West Jordan Municipal Code 
(hereinafter the "ordinance") which provided as follows 
6-7-101 WARNING AND SIGNAL DEVICES REQUIRED AT 
RAILROAD GRADE CROSSINGS 
At every location where the railroad track 
crosses a street, highway or other roadway 
utilized by vehicular traffic, the company or 
corporation operating such railroad shall install 
the appropriate signal or warning devices and 
lights, of a type specified by the Utah Depart-
ment of Transportation. 
6-7-102 FLAG OR GATES REQUIRED 
(a) At every location where a railroad track 
crosses a street, highway or other roadway and 
where there are not signal or warning devices as 
required by Section 6-7-101, above, the railroad 
company or corporation operating the said train 
shall provide two flagmen, one on each side of 
the grade crossing, to warn oncoming vehicular 
traffic of the approaching train. Said flagmen 
shall position themselves on each side of the 
grade crossing at the approach of the train where 
such train is so close as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard to vehicular traffic and shall 
remain so positioned until the train has cleared 
the grade crossing. Each flagman shall be 
equipped with a flag at least 16" square. In 
tines of darkness, the flagman shall be equipped 
with a red lantern capable of being visible under 
normal atmospheric condition for a distance of 
500'. In the alternative, the railroad company 
or corporation may elect to install gates which 
will be lowered upon approach of the train and 
which will remain lowered while the train is 
within the grade crossing. Said gates shall 
extend completely across the traffic lanes of 
that portion of the roadway and shall be con-
structed to also impede the passage of pedes-
trians and other nonvehicular traffic across the 
grade crossing. The gates shall be of a type and 
size to be readily visible in the lowered posi-
tion at a distance of 500' under normal atmos-
pheric conditions. At night, the gates shall 
contain on each side at least two red warning 
lights visible at a distance of 500*. 
-2-
(b) The requirements of subsection (a), above, 
shall be in addition to any other legal require-
ments concerning the sounding of a whistle or 
bell upon approach to such grade crossing. 
(c) The engineer operating such train and the 
conpany or corporation operating such railroad 
shall both be guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
the train crosses said grade crossing and such 
flagmen or gates are not so positioned, unless 
there are the warning devices required under 
Section 6-7-101, above 
9. All of the crossings affected by the above ordinance 
cr«. crossings of a right-of-way which plaintiff acquired from the 
Liriharr Canyon and Camp Floyd Railroad in approximately 1881. 
Tr.e railroad tracks have existed continually on this right-of-way 
since 1663, and the existence of the line of track pre-dates 
r.tst c: the city street? which now cross it within the boundary 
of the City of West Jordan 
10. The copulation of the City of West Jordan and its 
surrounding communities has increased substantially in recent 
years, and the volume of authomobile and other highway traffic 
upon the streets which cross the railroad right-of-way within 
the City of West Jordan has also increased. 
11. Railroad traffic on the tracks which traverse West 
Jordan has not increased in recent years. 
12. Neither the Utah State Department of Transportation 
nor the Utah State Public Service Commission has authorized the 
placement of flagmen, lights or any of the other protections 
referred to in the ordinance at any of the crossings which are 
subject to the ordinance since it was enacted 
13. Plaintiff's right-of-way through the City of West 
Jordan contains a single track which branches at approximately 
-000 West as shown below. Public roads cross the tracks at 
17 locations with sucn protective cevices as indicated 
below 
Mile Crossing 
Post Number Address Description 
BINGHAM BRANCH 
1.28 254-871K 1300 West 7960 South RxB-AW 
1.81 254-870D 1700 West 8100 South CFLS-B (Redwood Road) 
2.34 254-869J 2200 West 8250 South 
(8180 South) RxB-AW 
2.88 254-868C 2700 West 8400 South RxB-AW 
3.60 254-865G 3385 West 8600 South RxB-AW 
3 95 254-863T 3500 West 8650 South RxB (Dirt Crossing) 
4.50 255-377G 4000 West 8980 South RxB-AW (Old Binghar. Highway) 
4.77 254-965L 4200 West 9000 South RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway) 
5.69 254-968G 4800 West 9400 South RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway) 
6.30 255-373E 5200 West 9550 South RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway) 
GARFIELD BRANCH 
4.80 254-9667 4190 West 8970 South 
West Leg Wye RxB-AW (Old Binghair. Highway) 
4.95 254-967A 4300 West 9000 South 
East Leg Wye RxB-AW (Old Bingham Highway) 
6.43 254-963X 4620 West 7800 South RxB 
7.45 254-962R 4700 West 7000 South RxB (Dirt Crossing) 
8.48 254-961J 4780 West 6200 South RxB-AW 
SPUR TRACK PUBLIC CROSSING 
3.59 254-866!; 8600 South 3350 West RxB (Hatfield Copper) 
3.59 254-864A 8600 South 3400 West RxB (Plastroics Corp.) 
Key RxB-AW = Reflectorized Crossbuck with Advanced 
Warning Sign 
CFLS-B = Cantilevered Signal with Flashing Lights 
and Bell 
RxB = Reflectorized Crossbuck 
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14. The plaintiff presently runs two trains each way on 
the subject tracks on a regular, but not on a tinetable, basis 
each Monday through Thursday. The plaintiff runs one train each 
way on a regular, but not on a timetable, basis on Fridays and 
Saturdays. Irregular, and unscheduled trains also use the subject 
tracks from time to time. 
15. The plaintiff did not receive actual notice that the 
ordinance set forth in paragraph 6 above was under consiceration 
and, upon receiving notice of its enactment, the plaintiff imme-
diately requested an opportunitv to discuss this matter with 
officials of the City of West Jordan. 
16. A meeting was held on April 6, 1962, between 
representatives of the plaintiff and the city attorney and city 
manager of the City of West Jordan. At that meeting, the city 
manager stated that the city would not consider repeal nor any 
amendment of the ordinance and that the city fully intended to 
enforce the ordinance. 
17. In passing and enforcing the ordinance, defendants 
are acting under color of state law. 
18. The Court expressly makes no finding regarding 
whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by virtue of the fact 
that it arises unJcr the Ccnercc Clause, Article I, § 8, of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
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2. The Court also has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact that plaintiff 
is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Delaware and having its principal place of business in the State 
of Colorado, defendant West Jordan Municipal Corporation is a 
municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Utah and having its principal place of business ir, the 
State of Utah, defendants Dennis K. Randall, Allan G. Tolman, 
Shenri Monson, Chris Buttars, Betty Naylor, and Howard Barben are 
citizens of the State of Utah, and the matter in controversy 
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sinr of $10,000 
3. Venue is proper in the Central Division of this 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) in that all 
defendants reside within this division, the claims herein arise 
within this division, and defendant West Jordan Municipal Corpora-
tion functions as a municipal corporation within this division. 
4. This is an action for declaratory judgment pursuant 
to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 
for injunctive relief. 
5. Sections 10-8-36 and 10-6-83 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (Repl. Vol 1973) have been repealed to the extent they 
are inconsistent with the Public Utilities Act of 1917 The City 
of West Jordan had no power or authority to enact the ordinance 
known as Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West Jordan Municipal 
Code, and for this reason the said ordinance is null and void 
ab initio. 
6. The laws of the State of Utah have given the Utah 
Department of Transportation the exclusive power and authority to 
determine, prescribe, and allocate the costs of protecting rail-
road grade crossings within the State of Utah. The actions of the 
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Department of Transportation are subject to review by the Utah 
Public Service Commission. 
7. The protection of railroad grade crossings in the 
State of Utah is a matter of state-wide concern The legislative 
grant of authority to the Public Service Commission and the 
Department of Transportation in the State of Utah concerning the 
protection of railroad grade crossings is pervasive and has 
appropriated the entire field of activity in that regard. The 
ordinance enacted by the defendants, Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 
of the West Jordan Municipal Code, is therefore preempted by 
State law and is void 
8 The ordinance aforesaid is also preempted and is 
therefore void for the further reason that it is inconsistent 
witn the following State laws and regulations of the State of 
Utah. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15, 54-4-15.1, 54-4-15.3 (Supp. 
1981), Utah Public Service Commission Regulation A 67-05-61. 
9. The Court expressly makes no finding regarding 
whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable burden on 
interstate commerce. 
10. Because Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West 
Jordan Municipal Code are void, the plaintiff is entitled to have 
the Court issue a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants, 
and each of them, their deputies, agents, servants and employees 
from enforcing the said ordinance in any respect. 
DATED this _2£th da>' o f May . 1962. 
/s/ Bruce S. Jenkins 
bkucE ST~JE:JKINS~ 
United States District Judge 
